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Abstract
Both the pre-trial and dispositive roles of the French prosecutor
have continued to expand over the last decades with a resulting shift in
power away from the trial judge and the juge d'instruction. The
recommendations of the Liger Commission in 2009 went beyond the
redistribution of authority and proposed the abolition of the juge
d'instruction, placing the prosecutor in charge of all criminal
investigations, even the most serious, complex, and sensitive. At the
same time, the prosecutor's role and status has been challenged in a
number of ways-in particular concerning her function as judicial
supervisor of the detention and interrogation of suspects in the garde A
vue. The case of Medvedyev v. France called into question the
prosecutor's status as a judge and the string of cases beginning with
Salduz v. Turkey has caused several jurisdictions, including France,
to reconsider the provision made for custodial legal advice. There is a
real tension between the direction of reforms proposed within France
and the pressure from Europe to ensure more effective due process
safeguards. As a result of domestic litigation and constitutional
challenge, the French government is slowly relenting and allowing
lawyers a greater role. It has yet to grasp the nettle of the
independence of the prosecutor, however. The ECtHR has made it
clear that a judge must be independent of the executive and of the case
parties-both of which are contested in relation to the French
prosecutor. Within a procedural model in which defense rights are
secondary to the supposed truth-seeking ideology of the judicial
supervisor, the independence of the prosecutor is crucial.
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L. Introduction
The public prosecutor, the procureur, is central to the functioning of
the French criminal process-from investigation and prosecution through to
case disposition-and her role continues to grow.' Like so many other
jurisdictions, alongside a range of expedited trial procedures and
alternatives to prosecution, France has expanded the function of the
prosecutor in order to reduce the delay and expense associated with an ever-
increasing criminal caseload . The result has been a shift of power away
from the trial judge and the juge d'instruction 3 in favor of the procureur,
giving her significant dispositive powers: She is responsible for the
decision in nearly half of all criminal cases.4 The most recent reform
1. See, e.g., JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMP'ARATIVE
ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 75-79, 84 (2005)
[hereinafter HODGSON, FRENCH] (discussing the role of the procureur).
2. See generally Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the
Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Hodgson,
Guilty] (discussing the changing role of the French prosecutor in general and the
implications of the guilty plea in particular).
3. Ajuge d'instruction is a member of the French judiciary whose role is to supervise
criminal investigations. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 67.
4. See Jacqueline Hodgson, The Changing Role of the Crown Prosecutor, 79 CIM.
JUST. MATTERS 28, 28 (2010) [hereinafter Hodgson, Changing Role] ("In England and
Wales, as in many other European countries and the United States, there is a general trend
away from the courtroom disposition of cases and a corresponding expansion in the role of
the police and the prosecutor.").
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project is yet more radical, going beyond the redistribution of authority
among existing legal actors and proposing the abolition of the juge
d 'instruction and the transfer of all investigative powers to the procureur.5
The removal of France's most iconic criminal justice figure has proved
highly controversial.6 Although the juge d 'instruction deals with only a
small minority of criminal cases, these are often the most complex and
sensitive investigations concerning terrorism, fraud, drug trafficking and, of
course, political corruption. The prospect of removing these inquiries from
a politically independent and immovable judge and delivering them into the
hands of a public prosecutor who is hierarchically accountable to the
executive has caused many commentators to fear for the future political
independence of the criminal justice system.7
As a magistrat,8 the procureur is considered a judicial authority in
French law, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Grand
Chamber decision in the case of Medvedyev v. France9 has recently put this
authority in doubt. Although the court does not attack the status of the
prosecutor directly, the very specific terms of the court's endorsement of
the judicial status of the juge d 'instruction emphasize the importance of a
judge's independence from the executive and from the case parties, both of
which are highly contested in relation to the procureur.10 French criminal
justice reflects an essentially judge-centered model with inquisitorial roots,
in which the defense in particular plays a subsidiary role. The judicial
status of the person conducting or supervising the criminal investigation, in
this case the prosecutor, is therefore crucial.
5. See, e.g., John Lichfield, Sarkozy Goes to War with Napoleon's Legal Legacy,
INDEP., Jan. 7, 2009, at 20 (reporting on French President Nicolas Sarkozy's intention to call
for the abolition of the juges d'instruction and the transfer of all criminal investigations to
the public prosecution service).
6. See id. (reporting that President Sarkozy's call to abolish the role of juge
d'instruction would raise a "political and legal storm").
7. See id. (reporting one investigating judge's fear that "[tlhis reform will mean that
all sensitive cases. ... will be subject to political interference").
8. The term magistrat refers to an individual who is a member of the French
judiciary.
9. The first judgment was on July 10, 2008. See Medvedyev v. France, App. No.
3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 63 (2008) (holding that French authorities violated Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when they
detained plaintiffs on a boat for thirteen days without supervision by a judicial authority).
The final Grand Chamber judgment was on March 29, 2010. See Medvedyev v. France,
App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 103 (2010) (affirming the judgment).
10. See id. 114 (discussing the characteristics and powers of the investigating judge).
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A further, though indirect, line of attack on the procureur' s role comes
again from the ECtHR. In a series of cases beginning with Salduz v
Turkey," the ECtHR has stressed the requirement that custodial legal
advice be available to all suspects at the start of their police detention for
interrogation as part of the requirement for a fair trial under Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).'12 The court made clear
that custodial legal advice should be meaningful and effective in preparing
the suspect for interrogation and enabling her to prepare her defense.'"
France currently allows suspects a thirty-minute consultation with a lawyer
at the start of detention and again after twenty-four hours if detention is
extended.'14 The lawyer may know the date and nature of the charges, but
has no access to the dossier of evidence and has no right to be present
during the interrogation of her client.'15  The lawyer's role is therefore
limited by constraints of time and of information. Furthermore, legal
advice is delayed for forty-eight hours in cases of organized crime and
seventy-two hours for drug trafficking and terrorism.'16  Defense lawyers
argued successfully before the French courts that this delay clearly
breached the Salduz doctrine and went on to use the new question
prioritaire de constitutionnalitg procedure to challenge the compatibility of
the garde bz vue"1 with the French constitution. In a landmark decision,'1
8
clearly inspired by the jurisprudence of the ECtIIR, the Conseil
11. See Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (2008) (holding that
the Republic of Turkey violated Article 6 §§ 1 & 3-(c) of the Convention when it denied
Salduz access to a lawyer while he was in police custody and did not communicate the
written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation).
12. See id. 50 ("As the Court has already held in previous judgments, the right [to
custodial legal advice] set out in paragraph 3-(c) of Article 6 of the Convention is one
element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings . .. .)
13. See id. 37 (citing Rule 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners which allows "an untried prisoner. ... to receive visits from his legal adviser").
14. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PtN.] art. 63-4 (Fr.) [hereinafter C. PR. PEN.].
15. See id. (noting that a defendant may request to speak to an advocate, but the
advocate simply speaks to the client for no more than thirty minutes and has no access to
information outside of what she learns from the client during that conversation).
16. See id (stating that an advocate must wait forty-eight hours to interview a client in
custody for offenses like organized crime; for other offenses like drug trafficking and
terrorism, the advocate must wait seventy-two hours to interview the detained client).
17. The period of detention and interrogation in police custody.
18. One of the lawyers bringing the case described the decision as a "revolution" in the
Le Monde headline the next day. Aline Leclerc, Garde &i vue: "Cette decision est une
v~ritable revolution!", LE MONDE, July 30, 2010, http://www.lemnonde.fr/societe/article/
2010/07/30/garde-a-vue-cette-decision est-une-veritable revolution_1394198_3224.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
1364
THE FRENCH PROSECUTOR IN QUESTION 16
constitutionnel ruled on July 30, 2010 that the legal provisions regulating
the garde b~ vue were contrary to the constitution.' 9 This has, in turn,
resulted in the Minister of Justice modifying the garde 6~ vue section of the
reform project first presented in March 2010 to allow lawyers to be present
during the police interrogation of the suspect.20 This is a major step
forward, but there are limitations to the right and the effectiveness of the
reform. If agreed by Parliament, the success of this new advisory function
will also depend on the availability of legal aid and the proper training of
lawyers.2
The judicial supervision of criminal investigations in France is a
powerful remnant of its former inquisitorial procedure, in which the defense
is considered less important than in an adversarial, two-party model. The
garde 6 vue is no exception to this position. Suspects in France enjoy a
very limited right to custodial legal advice during the period of police
detention and interrogation.2 The principal due process protection is
understood to be the judicial oversight provided by the officer in control of
the investigation-an investigation that does not focus simply on the
suspect, but which is oriented towards the discovery of both incriminating
and exculpating evidence.2 However, the judicial officer responsible for
the conduct of the garde 6 vue and for authorizing the detention of suspects
for up to forty-eight hours is the procureur, whose status as a judicial
24
authority is currently in question. The garde 6~ vue is therefore subject to
challenge on two fronts-the adequacy of its legal regulation by the
procureur and the adequacy of the right to custodial legal advice.
In this way, both current government reform projects-the abolition of
the juge d 'instruction and the reform of the garde ii vue-are inextricably
19. Conseil constitutiomiel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-14/22QPC,
July 30, 2010, J.0. 105, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionmellroot/bank mmn/anglais/en2OlOl4qpc.pdf. The court did not rule on the
exceptional provisions relating to organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, having
already examined them in 2004.
20. This was presented to the Conseil d'etat on September 7, 2010.
21. See generally MIKE MCCONVILLE & JACQUELINE HODGSON, CUSTODIAL LEGAL
ADVICE AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (1993) (discussing these issues in relation to a similar
reform in England and Wales).
22. Indeed, this right was first available in 1993, but only after the suspect had been in
police custody for twenty hours. In 2000, custodial legal advice was finally made available
from the start of detention. C. PR. PtN., supra note 14, art. 634.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the first and Grand Chamber
judgments in Medvedyev, opinions that questioned the judicial authority of the procureur).
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linked with debate around the proper role and status of the procureur. Is
she sufficiently independent to head up all criminal investigations within a
procedural model in which defense rights are secondary to the supposed
truth-seeking ideology and function of judicial supervision? And does she
qualify as a judge for the purpose of authorizing the detention in police
custody of a suspect for forty-eight hours, offering the kind of protection
that has been claimed to justify the now-contested, diminished rights to
custodial legal advice?
IT. The Role and Professional Status of the Procureur
When making comparisons between different legal processes,
functional equivalence is often more elusive than it might first appear. The
French public prosecutor, the procureur, shares many characteristics with
her comm-on law counterparts: For example, she prepares cases for trial
and prosecutes them in court .2 5 But just as there are dissimilarities between
even apparently similar common law prosecution systems-for example,
the English/Welsh Crown Prosecutor makes no recommendation as to
sentence, unlike the American prosecutor2 6-there are major differences
between the role and status of the procureur and the American prosecutor
or the Crown Prosecutor in England and Wales.
The procureur is a public prosecutor, but is also part of the judiciary or
magistrature. Alongside the trial judge and the juge d'instruction, she is a
magistrat. All three magistrats enjoy a common training-though each
will specialize in her chosen branch during this period-and it is possible,
and indeed not unconmmon, for magisfrats to switch between the three
28functions during their careers. 8The procureur is not understood to be a
25. See Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2. at 3 ("[The procureur] is responsible for the
decision to prosecute, as well as bringing the prosecution case in court and on appeal.").
26. See Hodgson, Changing Role, supra note 4, at 28 (discussing the changing
perception of the Crown Prosecutor which would recast prosecutors as sentencers).
27. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 65-72 (discussing the history and nature
of the French magistrature).
28. See PRESIDENT ANDREt VALLENI & RAPPORTEUR PHILIPPE HOUILLoN, ASSEMBLfE
NATIONALE RAPPORT [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT] No. 3125, June 6, 2006, at 446
[hereinafter NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125] (noting that each year, around 9% of
procureurs move to positions asjuges du si~ge and some 6% move in the other direction).
Juge du si~ge is a broad category of judges in France of which a juge d'instruction is one
part' and the role of juges du si~ge includes making orders, judgments, and decisions. But
see Mlaine Salles, Interview with Denis Salas, Il man que une part d'autonomie au parquet
franvais, LE MONDE, May 8, 2009, at 9 (noting that 70% of procureurs have spent their
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judicial officer in quite the same sense as the trial judge or even the juge
d'instruction: These two are part of what is called the sitting judiciary,
while the prosecutor is part of the standing judiciary.29 This distinction has
important implications for the independence of each. While the sitting
judiciary is immovable and independent of the orders and authority of the
executive, the parquet is hierarchically accountable to the minister of
justice and to the executive. The Minister is free to issue written
instructions to the parquet. 30  She may also move, promote, or transfer
procureurs or nominate her own political allies .3 '1 This subordination to
political authority risks undermining the political independence of the
prosecutor as a judicial officer. 2 On the other hand, it is considered an
important means of ensuring that criminal justice policy is properly the
responsibility of government and is not within the discretion of the
individual procureur. 33 Despite these differences between the two types of
magistrat, the Constitutional Court has confirmed the status of the
procureur as a judicial authority. 
34
The judicial status of the procureur is essential to the pivotal role that
she plays within the criminal justice process, a role that goes far beyond the
entire career in the prosecution service (the parquet)).
29. Interestingly, this is not a distinction made by most French citizens. See Camille
Mialot, La partie publique au proc~s p~nal doit-elle 6tre reprisentge par un magisfrat?, 37
RECUEIL DALLOZ 2497, 2498 (2009) (reporting that, in a study commissioned by the
governing body of the magistrature-the Conseil sup~rieure de la magistrature-9% of
the 1,008 people representing French society made no distinction between magistrats du
siege and the parquet).
30. The Minister may instruct the procureur to proceed with a case, but not to drop a
prosecution. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 14, art. 30 (allowing the Minister to "initiate
prosecutions or to cause them to be initiated"). Formerly, the Minister was able to issue oral
instructions. Although this is no longer permitted, in order to ensure better transparency and
accountability, it may be difficult to resist the instructions of the person responsible for your
career advancement. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 76-77.
31. See, e.g., Alain Salles, Jeu de chaises musicales dans la magistrature, LE MONDE,
Dec. 10, 2009, at 13 (discussing the political nature of some appointments).
32. See Alain Salles, Les procureurs fran~ais sont-ils vraiment des magistrats?, LE
MONDE, May 8, 2009, at 1 (reporting that the lawyer for the applicants in the Grand
Chamber hearing of Medvedyev presented a number of examples of the very real ways in
which procureurs are subordinated and even sanctioned by the executive power).
33. But see Giuseppe Di Federico, Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic
Requirement of Accountability in Italy: Analysis of a Deviant Case in a Comparative
Perspective, 38 BiT. J. CRIMINOL. 371, 371 (1998) (discussing the negative consequences of
the Italian justice system in which the prosecutor is wholly independent and free to make
arbitrary and political decisions).
34. See CC decision No. 93-326DC, Aug. 11. 1993, J.0. 11599 (discussing the
procureur's pivotal role in the pre-trial detention decision).
367
16867 WASH & LEE L. REV 1361 (2010)
prosecution of cases. Increasingly, she is a player in local criminal justice
policy-making and inter-agency cooperation, such that procureurs have
come to exercise "a hybrid function, half executive, half judicial and [they]
have become the necessary interface between the judiciary, the state and
civil society."06  They also have the power to initiate alternatives to
prosecution and trial such as mediation and a range of alternative
sanctions.3 Most recently, the procureur has been empowered to propose a
reduced sentence to the accused in exchange for a guilty plea-a radical
reform indeed for a jurisdiction that, until that time, did not even recognize
a formal system of pleas.3 8
Perhaps the most significant function of the procureur, and one that
touches the majority of cases, is her role as a pre-trial judicial authority:
She is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime under CPP
Article 41.3 This includes directing the activity of the police and
overseeing the police detention and interrogation of suspects held in garde
40a vue. In most instances, the procureur retains control of the case and
decides whether to prosecute, institute alternative proceedings such as
mediation, or to dismiss the case .4' In a minority of instances-around 4%
of cases-the procureur will pass the inquiry to the juge d'instruction, who
42possesses wider powers of investigation than the procureur. The juge
35. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 84 ("[Tlhe procureur is increasingly
implicated in the debate, stimulation and co-ordination [sic] of local penal policy, as well as
in various forms of inter-agency co-operation [sic]."); Patricia Bdnec'h-le Roux, Chief
Public Prosecutor: A Strengthened Professional Identity, 2007 PENAL ISSUES 15, 15,
available at http://www.cesdip.fr/IMG/Pdf/PI 1-2007.pdf (analyzing the prosecutor's
position within the magistracy and the justice system, including the evolution of her
professional identity).
36. Hubert Dalle & Daniel Soulez-Larivi~re, Dgbats, Justice: 6~ la recherche de la
bonne coupure, LE MONDE, May 30, 2002, at 18.
37. See B~nec'h-le Roux, supra note 35, at 15 ("[The public prosecutor's] role ... has
grown in importance with the expansion of diversion, the so called the [sic] <<third track >
(victim-offender mediation and restoration) and with the establishment of alternative modes
of prosecution . .. ." (citations omnitted)).
38. See Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing in detail the system of pleas).
39. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 14, art. 41 ("The district prosecutor institutes or causes
to be taken any step necessary for the discovery and prosecution of violations of the criminal
law.",).
40. See id. (noting that the district prosecutor supervises all police custody measures).
41. See MINIS~TRE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES LIBERTts, LES CHIEFRES-CLES DE LA JUSTICE
14 (2009) (finding that of the 668,946 legal proceedings, 23,409 came before the Juge
d 'instruction).
42. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 14, art. 80 (stating that the juge d'instruction can only
investigate cases referred by the procureur); id. art. 82 (stating that the juge d'instruciion
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d'instruction will question the accused 43 -known as the mise en examen
once the accused is a suspect in the instruction process-instruct experts
where necessary,"4 and carry out any acts of investigation she considers
useful in her search for the truth .4 ' These are two different models of
judicial supervision. While the procureur oversees what is essentially a
police investigation, the luge d'instruction is personally responsible for the
instruction inquiry; she may delegate specific acts of investigation to named
police officers, but not the questioning of the accused.4
One of the main criticisms of the instruction has been the duality of
the juge d'instruction's role as investigator and as judge-requiring her to
be both Maigret and Solomon, as it is often described .4 ' The majority of
the L~ger Commission considered this fundamental ambiguity to be fatal:
How can a judge who is also responsible for a criminal investigation,
remain neutral?48  Historically, the most controversial power of the juge
d 'instruction was her authority to place a suspect under investigation in pre-
trial detention' 4 9 but this function is now exercised by a judge independent
of the instruction, the luge des Iibert~s et de la d~tention.50 Claims as to the
schizophrenic role of thejuge d'instruction therefore seem rather weak.
However, this duality is also present in the role of the procureur. 
5 1
She is in charge of the investigation of crime, but at the same time carries
may, according to the law, carry out all inquiries that he considers necessary to the discovery
of the truth).
43. See id. art. 80-2 ("[A] placement under judicial examination may not take place
until after the person's first appearance before the investigating judge.") (Jason Rason
Spencer trans.).
44. See id art. 156 ("The experts carry out their task under the supervision of the
investigating judge .... 1)
45. See id. art. 82 (stating that the juge d'instruction may, according to the law, carry
out all inquiries that he considers necessary to the discovery of the truth).
46. See generally Jacqueline Hodgson, The Police, the- Prosecutor and the Juge
D 'instruction: Judicial Supervision in France, Theory and Practice, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL.
342 (200 1), for an analysis of judicial supervision of police investigations.
47. See, e.g., Robert Badinter, La mortprogrammie dujuge d'instruction, LE MONDE,
Mar. 22, 2009, at 17 (criticizing the simultaneous role of the juge d'instruction as
investigator and decision-maker).
48. Thejuge d'instruction also has the power send a case to trial.
49. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 214-19, for a discussion of the use of
investigation during pre-trial detention.
50. See C. PR. PEI.m, supra note 14, art. 137-1 ("Pre-trial detention is ordered and
extended by the liberty and custody judge.").
5 1. See Jacqueline Hodgson, The Role Played by the Juge in the Protection of the
Suspect's Rights During the Police Investigation, in JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE FRENCH 'JUGE'
I QUESTION 207, 221 n.32 (2004) (noting that one senior procureur said: "What is the role
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out a judicial function in authorizing the detention of suspects in garde 6
vue for up to forty-eight hours.5 Any extension beyond this, in cases of
suspected drug trafficking, organized crime or terrorism, may only be
ordered by the ]uge des liberes et de la de~ention-a magistrat du si~ge
who is also independent of the investigation.5" It seems the procureur is
sufficiently judicial to authorize detention for two days, but no longer .54 If
this duality of judicial and investigative power is a problem for the juge
d 'instruction, it is all the more so for the prosecutor, who is not a magistrat
du si~ge and yet is authorized to place a suspect in police detention for up
to two days."5 What is the significance of the distinction between the
procureur and the juges du sijge? If the latter represent a purer judicial
model in the sense that they are removed from the parties in the case and
tend to have a more adjudicative role, does it make sense to see the
procureur as a judicial authority? And if the juge d'instruction's former
power to detain suspects was considered a serious conflict of interest, what
justification is there for the procureur's authority to do the same thing-
albeit for a shorter period of time? Surely it would be more appropriate for
this decision to be made by a magistrat du si~ge such as the judge
authorized to extend garde ii vue beyond forty-eight hours, the juge des
liberftis et de la ditention.
of the parquet? Is it to immerse yourself completely in the direction of the investigation, or
is it to keep a quasi-olympian detacment ... ? Of course, I think, it is something between
the two").
52. The Conseil constitutionnel ruled that the procureur could authorize the detention
of a suspect in police custody for forty-eight hours; any further detention must be authorized
by ajuge du si~ge. CC decision No. 2004-492DC, Mar. 2, 2004, J.O. 4637 (citing § 706-88
of the C. PR. PtN.).
53. See C. PR. PI N., supra note 14. art. 706-88 ("[I]f the foreseeable length of the
remaining investigations . . . justify this, the liberty and custody judge or the investigating
judge may decide .. , that the custody period will be extended by one single period of forty-
eight hours.").
54. In terms of case disposition too, the power of the prosecutor is limited. Thirough
the composition p~nale, the procureur may propose a range of measures to an accused who
admits the offense-compensation to the victim, a drug rehabilitation order, a fine, a
community service order-but these must be endorsed by a court. See Hodgson, Guilty,
supra note 2, at 7-8 (describing the procureur as a quasi-sentencer). Because the procureur
is a prosecutor, not a judge, she does not have formal sentencing authority. See id at 8
(noting the Conseil constitutionnel's refusal to "turn[] the procureur into a judge by allowing
her to hand down a sentence").
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the duality of the
procureur).
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Iff. Judicial Corporatism
Given the different nature of the judicial authority represented by the
parquet and the juges du si~ge, does it make sense for them both to belong
to a common judicial grouping, the magistrature? Does their shared status
as magistrats enhance their functioning, or mask the pronounced
differences in their role and orientation? Some have suggested that their
training and professional status should reflect the distinction between the
standing and sitting judiciary. 56  Others emphasize that while there are
differences between the functions of the different types of magistrat, their
professional proximity, common training and ability to move between
functions, are important to their independent outlook. 7  The idea is that
seeing herself as a magistrat and as part of a wider judicial authority acting
in the wider public interest prevents the procureur from becoming captive
to a narrow prosecution perspective. As one senior procureur expressed it
in my own empirical study:
Procureurs are magistrats and can become trial judges, or juges
d'instruction. I think that this position is really a question of culture.
That is to say that here, recruitment is by a single competitive
examination and in this context, it is believed that all magistrats can be
called on to carry out all of the three functions. This has the advantage
that one can put oneself in the place of the juge, certainly to be less
partisan and to understand the strict requirements of evidence. ...
[M]any people have been juges du si~ge and in the parquet.. . [and]
that has the potential to vary your viewpoint.5
Or, as a senior procureur in a different region explained:
[,Magistrats du si~ge or the parquet, I make no distinction, because in
reality, the approach is very similar. I have spent my entire career in the
parquet, but tomorrow, I could be au si~ge and I would not change an
iota. I have colleagues who were formerly au si~ge and we reason in the
same way [or rather] the approach to problems is the samef'
9
56. See NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 447-49 (presenting
opinions of several French magistrates on the relationship between the parquet and the
si~ge).
57. See id (noting that most of the magistrats interviewed preferred to preserve the
current system).
58. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 70.
5 9. Id
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However, this closeness and the sense of being members of the same
"'club," can also have an adverse effect on the independence of each .60 As
the Outreau affair demonstrates, this can also be problematic when
different magistrats .place too much trust in their colleagues,
unquestioningly adopt the same approach and the same perspective, and the
system of checks and balances breaks down.6
The shared professional status of trial judges, prosecutors and juges
d'instruction can also have a detrimental effect on the defense's ability to
act as any form of counter balance to the judicial inquiry. All that unites
magistrats-t heir common training, public interest centred ideology and
judicial status-serves to reinforce the defense lawyer (an avocat) as a
professional outsider. The Outreau Report62 demonstrated this idea
pointedly when it recommended that Inagistrats would broaden their
outlook further if they trained not only with one another, but also alongside
lawyers for a year .6 ' The arrangements for the investigation of terrorist
offenses also demonstrate this idea.64 The combination of this form of
judicial corporatism, together with the weak role that the defense lawyer
plays, places in question the independence of the pre-trial inquiry as well as
its ability to incorporate a more contradictoire procedure 6 ' as set out in the
preliminary article of the CPP.66  While the trial has a more accusatorial
flavor to it, the more inquisitorial nature of the pre-trial has an enormous
60. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 448 (reporting
on an interview with Guy Canivet in which he expresses doubt that one can neutrally pass
from one function to the other).
61. See generally Alexandra Fouchid, Outreau Puts French Justice in Question, BBC
NEWS ONLINE, July 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3852673.stm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2010) (discussing the Outreau case) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); infra Part III.A (same).
62. On the day that the six appellants had their convictions quashed by the cour
d'assises, December 1, 2005, the Minister of Justice instructed the inspecteur gmi~ral des
services judiciaries to conduct an administrative investigation into the various malfunctions
of the Outreau case. MINISTtRE DE LA JUSTICE, INSPECTION GENERALE DES SERVICES
JUDICIAiREs, RAPPORT: CONDITIONS DE TRAITEMENT JUDICIAIP.E DE L'AFFALRE DITE
"D'OUTREAU" (2006), available at http:/Iesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/
064000472/0000.pdf. A parliamentary inquiry was also carried out in 2006. NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28.
63. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 443.
64. See infra Part 11I.13 (discussing terrorist offense investigations).
65. This term does not translate as adversarial, but is closer to accusatorial. It refers to
the right to respond to the accusations against you and to have sufficient information to do
this.
66. See C. PR. PEN., supra note 14, art. 1-P ('Criminal procedure should be fair and
accusatorial and preserve a balance between the rights of the parties.").
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impact on the way in which the judge will receive the evidence; judges
afford more credibility to material presented in the prosecution dossier as
part of a public-interest-centered neutral judicial investigation than they
afford to self-interested evidence put forward by the defense .6 It is
therefore crucial that the defense is able to have some input into the pre-
trial investigation and some influence over the evidence that the magistrat
will present in the case. If the independence of the procureur is further
called into question, the corresponding limitations on defense rights must
be as well.
A. Outreau
The findings of the Parliamentary inquiry into the Outreau case
demonstrated the systematic nature of this judicial corporatism, the
difficulties experienced by defense lawyers trying to assert their rights to
participate in the case investigation, and the disastrous effects that this
unchecked concentration of power can have. While the focus of criticism
has been on the juge d 'instruction acting in the case, Fabrice Burgaud, the
problems identified are inextricably linked to the role and independence of
the procureur. 68  The case concerned accusations of child sexual abuse
made by a number of children and adults in the town of Outreau in
Northern France.6 When the case came to trial in July 2004, two of the
accused retracted their statements against their co-accused and the
prosecution case collapsed.7 Seven of the seventeen defendants were
acquitted in the cour d 'assises (trial court) and six more by the Paris cour
d'assises, on appeal, in December 2005 .71 Between them, they served
almost twenty-six years in d~tention proviso ire while the juge d'instruction
carried out his investigation and one suspect, Frangois Mourmand, died in
custody.7
2
67. See Hodgson, Changing Role, supra note 4, at 5 (noting the argument that, unlike
the adversarial model which requires "both sides to be active," the inquisitorial model "is of
a more neutral centralised enquiry in which the prosecutor plays the part of judicial
investigator or supervisor").
68. See NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 513-26 (offering a
summary of the problems identified by the inquiry).
69. See id at 21 (introducing the details of the affair).
70. Id.
7 1. Id
72. Id at 22.
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The repercussions of the case were enormous, resulting in the
establishment of the first ever Parliamentary inquiry into a criminal case as
well as a full investigation by the Ministry of Justice.7 As an instruction,
this was a case to which all of the safeguards and cross-checks of the
defense's right to participate in the judicial investigation attached: The
defense could challenge and propose evidence.7 In the case of
disagreement, the parties could make appeals to the Chambre de
1 instruction .7 5  However, the report was critical of the single-case
viewpoint offered by the procureur and juge d'instruction and the absence
of reflexivity among magistrats: Although the case passed through the
hands of some sixty different magistrats, none of them challenged either the
central case thesis or the methods of investigation.7 The Parliamentary
inquiry found that the procureur dominated the investigation rather than
acting as any form of check, and both he and the juge d 'instruction adopted
a wholly prosecutorial perspective to the case-they worked only 6 charge
(with an eye towards discovering incriminating evidence)." The fact that
the juge d'instruction, in his submission to the cour d'assises, simply
copied and pasted his final case conclusions from those of the procureur
underlines the unity of perspective of the .juge d'insfruction and the
prosecutor.7 They saw the suspects' declarations of innocence as justifying
repressive measures, and the commission of inquiry was shocked to hear
that the procureur and juge d'instruction considered such assertions as
good reason to keep suspects in detention during the investigation.7
Throughout this process, the juge d'instruction systematically
prevented the defense from participating in the inquiry, from challenging
73. See NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 5-6 (including a
foreword by President Andrd Vallini in which he calls the affair a human tragedy and notes
that the Parliamentary inquiry was followed by millions in France). One might argue that it
is inappropriate and offends against the principle of the separation of powers for parliament
to conduct an inquiry into the functioning of the justice system.
74. See Hodgson, Changing Role, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that during the
instruction, formal provisions for defense's presence or engagement exist).
75. See C. PR. PtN., supra note 14, § XII (mandating that appeals be lodged before the
Chambre de 1 instruction (the investigating chamber)).
76. See NATioNAL ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 3125, supra note 28, at 276 (identifying the
absence of a culture of control as one of the main problems with this case).
77. See id at 9 1-158 (explaining the power of the procureur and the prosecutorial
perspective that linked her to the juge d'instruction).
78. See id. at 148 (noting that copying and pasting took place in 95% of the cases).
79. See id. at 33 (indicating the commission's reaction to the argument that this is a
valid reason for holding suspects in detention).
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his findings and methods, and from stimulating investigation 6* d&harge.80
Statements were taken from the children making the accusations in ways
that produced unreliable evidence, but the juge d'instruction did not permit
the defense to examine these witnesses on the grounds that it might
traumatize the children further.8
After the juge d'instruction discovered that accusations of murder
connected with a pedophile ring in Belgium were without foundation, he
simply cut firom the dossier the testimony of the relevant witnesses who had
lied and did not seem to doubt their overall credibility in relation to other
evidence.8 By removing their false testimony from the dossier, the juge
d'instruction placed the defense outside the procedure and deprived it of
any opportunity to question the witnesses' character. The juge
d'instruction also deprived the cour d'assises of important evidence. Yet,
as a simple administrative measure, this action was not subject to appeal .8
Both the parquet and the juge d'instruction agreed to this deception. 8
In other instances, the luge overplayed his hand, implying that he was
in possession of evidence that he was not and instructing the police to
question a suspect on this basis .85 Instead of correcting these problems, the
pre-trial appeal court, the Chambre de 1 instruction, compounded them by
conducting only paper reviews and demonstrating a clear tendency to
reinforce the position taken by the juge and the parquet. 86 Quite simply, the
defense lawyer was described as an unwelcome outsider and the
investigating judge did not receive his counter-arguments well. The inquiry
questioned whether, given the negative experiences of defense lawyers and
80. See id. at 98-112 (describing the ways in which the defense was unable to
participate in the investigation).
81. See id at 98-99 (giving further traumatization as the reason for keeping the
defense lawyer from interviewing the juvenile accusers).
82. See id at 149-51 (noting that thejuge d'instruction allowed the skewed account of
the affair in the dossier).
83. See id at 151 (noting that this decision was technically a judicial administrative
measure and thus not subject to review).
84. See id. (providing the accounts of several people who were critical of the joint
deception).
85. See id at 194-95 (criticizing the juge d'instruction's decision to have the police
question the individual as a mere suspect, when there was clearly enough evidence to make
him mise en examen and thus subject to the rights and protections of being an accused within
the instruction).
86. See id at 280-81 (indicating that the solidarity between the Chambre de
I instruction and the juge and parquet was a problem of judicial culture).
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their treatment by magistrats, one can consider the French criminal justice
to be accusatorial and fair.17
Alongside proposals for juges d'instruction to work in a more
collegial way in order to avoid the premature narrowing of the inquiry that
was so evident in this case, the report discussed whether the parquet
should move to a career path and standing that is different from the
judiciary, creating a greater degree of separation between the two roles.
Procureurs contest this idea, insist on the importance of their status as
magistrats who guarantee individual rights and freedoms, and oppose
fiercely changes that, in their view, will reduce them to the status of
fonctionnaires or bureaucrats.89 An alternative solution may be to retain
the hierarchical link with the Minster of Justice, thus ensuring the uniform
application of penal policy, but remove responsibility for nomination and
career progression to the professional regulating body for the judiciary,
the Conseil supgrieure de la magistrature (CSM), as with the
magistrature du sijge.
B. Terrorism Investigations
Investigations into terrorist cases provide a very particular example of
judicial working methods. A specialist section of counter-terrorism juges
d'instruction and procureurs based in Paris carries out these investigations,
with policy coordinated through the Ministry of Justice.90 Members of the
section work closely with intelligence officers in the Direction de la
Surveillance du Territoire (DST).91 Trust is the key to the magistrat-police
87. See id. at 191 (explaining the problems inherent in relegating defense lawyers to a
secondary or auxiliary role in the judicial process).
88. See id. at 446-50 (providing several professional opinions in support of the notion
that there needs to be more distance between the prosecution and the judiciary).
89. See Jean-Louis Nadal, Un risque pour notre justice et nos libertis, LE MONDE,
June 2, 2006, at 18 (setting out the views of one such prosecutor); Jean-Frangois Renucci,
Un sdisme judiciaire: pour la CEDH les magistrats du parquet ne sont pas une autoritg
judiciaire, 9 RECUEIL LE DALLOZ 600, 600-01 (2009) (same).
90. See Jacqueline Hodgson, The Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Suspects
in France: Report for the Home Office 37-3 8 [hereinafter Hodgson, The Investigation],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1321868 (providing a
general description of the terror investigation procedures in France).
91. See id. at 12-13 (discussing the roles of the DST). This body has both
administrative and judicial attributes. Id. It works on prevention and repression of terrorist
activities as well as general counter-espionage work. Id.
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relationship in ordinary cases,92 and it is even more pronounced among
this specialist corps of individuals.9 As with all instruction investigations,
the defense, as well as the procureur and the victim or partie civile, have
the right to request that certain acts of investigation be carried out by the
juge d'instruction, as well as to challenge the procedural legality of the
procedure and to apply for bail to the juge des liberks et de la d~tention.9
Appeal against refusal by either judge lies to the Chambre de
V instruction.95 The defense has been present in the instruction since 1897
when she first gained the right to be present during the judicial questioning
of her client and to have access to the dossier of evidence.9 The reforms of
2000 strengthened her ability to participate in the investigation and broadly
gave her the same opportunities as the procureur. 9 7 This is potentially an
important counterbalance in the instruction process, an opportunity to
ensure that the juge has considered all lines of inquiry and remains alive to
defense as well as prosecution concerns-investigating 6~ charge et ii
d&harge (from both the prosecution and the defense perspective).
In terrorism cases, this counterbalance is especially important given
the very close working relationships that exist between the procureur, juges
d'instruction and the security services, and the sharing of evidence and
intelligence between them beyond any instant case.98 In practice, the length
and complexity of the case dossier makes it very difficult for the defense to
review the investigation as it is ongoing.9 In non-terrorist cases, as noted
by the Outreau inquiry, the defense is a structural, institutional, and
ideological outsider: Magistrats act in the public interest in the search for
the truth, while lawyers act in the interests of suspected criminals in the
search for an acquittal.' 00 Also, despite the assertions of politicians in
92. See generally HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 156-61; CHISTIAN' MOUHANNA
& WERNER ACKERmANN, POLICES JUDICIAIREs Er MAGISTRATS: UNE AFFAIRE DE
CONFIANCE (2001).
93. See Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2, at 39-40 (describing the relationship between
the magistrats and the police).
94. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 120-2 1.
95. Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2, at 43.
96. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 117.
97. Id at 118-2 1l(describing the expanded rights of the defense attorney).
98. See Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing the often ongoing
relationships between the various branches over multiple investigations).
99. See id. at 43 n.69 ("As magistrats acknowledged to us, it is very difficult for the
defence to review the dossier during the investigation, given its length and complexity.").
100. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Outreau inquiry and outlining the ways in
which the defense is on the periphery of investigation and trial procedures).
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France and elsewhere that terrorism is a crime and will be treated as such,
the political and foreign policy contexts of terrorism add to the risk that the
defense perspective will be subordinated to security concerns in these
investigations. Recent terrorist trials suggest that the defense faces
enormous hurdles when challenging the evidential basis of the prosecution,
and this was confirmed in my own research.' 0 ' Judicial corporatism is
amplified in the closed world of counter-terrorism judges and judicial
counter-checks are of little assistance to the defense. When explaining their
role as specialist judges within the Chambre de 1 instruction, the juges
stated that they would rarely make a ruling against the juge d'instruction."
It was clear that they trusted and favored the approach of the fellow
inagistrat, the juge, over that of the defense lawyer.
IV The Independence of the Procureur
While public attention has focused on the conflicting roles played by
the juge d'instruction, we have seen that these are replicated to some extent
in the roles ascribed to the procureur.'03 There are also real concerns that,
far from ensuring an independence of outlook, their common status as
magistrats risks blurring the functional separation between the procureur
and the juge d'instruction.YM More recently, the procureur's very status as
a member of the judiciary has been called into question.'0 5 Does she
provide sufficient guarantees of independence to exercise the power and
authority entrusted to a judge? The LUger Commission, in setting out a
number of proposals to reform the French criminal justice process,
answered this question in the affirmative: The procureur's status as a
magistrat remains key in justifying the steady increase in prosecutorial
power and in maintaining a centralized model of judicial supervision.1
06
The ECtHR, however, in its recent Grand Chamber judgment of
101. See generally Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2.
102. See id. at 43 ("it is exceptional that [the Chambre de l'instruction] would rule
against the juge d'instruction . .-. ")
103. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing the procureur's role as
pre-trial judicial authority).
104. See supra Part HI (discussing the role and status of the procureur).
105. See supra Part lV.B (discussing the status of the procureur and of a judge in
Medvedyev).
106. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the LUger Commission).
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Medvedyev, cast serious doubt on the procureur's status as a judicial
authority.10 7 I will examine these two contrasting approaches in turn.
A. Chronicle ofa Death Foretold: Liger
In September 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed the ComitJ
de reflexion sur la justice pinale, chaired by Philippe L6ger. 08  After a
decade of reforms, the Commission's brief was to consider measures that
would restore coherence to French criminal law and procedure, as well as
being effective in addressing all forms of criminality and respecting the
rights of victims and the accused. 09 Somewhat prematurely,"o given that
the Commission was not due to report until later in 2009, President Sarkozy
announced his intention to abolish the juge d'instruction in his address at
the formal re-opening of the Cour de cassation (the highest appeals court)
on January 7, 2009.111 As anticipated, one of the key recommendations of
the L6ger Commission in its final report in September 2009 was to abolish
the juge d'instruction and place the public prosecutor in charge of all
criminal investigations." 2
Although presented as a rational separation of investigative and
judicial functions, the proposal has been criticized widely. The juge
d'instruction is politically independent and immovable, while the procureur
is hierarchically subordinate to the minister of justice and so to the
executive. 1 3  Those investigated by the juge d'instruction also enjoy
107. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the status of the procureur in Medvedyev).
108. PHILIPPE LtGER, RAPPORT DU COMITt DE REFLEXION SUR LA JUSTICE PtNALE 1
(2009) [hereinafter LEGER REPORT].
109. See id. (detailing the Commission's brief in the opening address to the President
and the Prime Minister).
110. As a result of this announcement, two members of the Commission resigned.
111. See Yves Laurin, Le President de la Rdpublique et L'autoritd Judiciaire, 34
RECUEIL LE DALLOz 2396, 2396-97 (2007) (questioning the President's mixture of justice
and politics when he set out major themes for justice reform and addressed the re-opening of
the Cour de cassation).
112. See Editorial, Rapport Liger, Mais Pas Insignificant, 30 RECUEIL LE DALLOZ
2025, 2025 (2009) (describing the commission as docile in carrying out the wishes of the
President).
113. See Nathalie Guibert, Le Prince, le Juge et le Bourreau, LE MONDE, Jan. 16, 2009,
[hereinafter Guibert, Le Prince] available at 2009 WLNR 792706 (questioning the need for
reforms as set out by groups like the Lger Commission). The nature of the parquet's
subordination to the executive is illustrated by an episode on January 8, 2009, when
procureurs in Nancy were reprimanded by their superiors for standing and applauding the
speech of the president of the court when it returned after the holiday recess. Id. The
1379
67 WASH. & LEEL. REV 1361 (2010)
greater due process rights than those subject to a police investigation
overseen by the procureur.114 The suspect may have her lawyer present in
any interrogation by the juge d'instruction-the police are not permitted to
interrogate the suspect once the information has been opened and she is
formally under judicial investigation as a mise en examen-and she has
access to the dossier throughout the inquiry.s15 All parties-the suspect,
prosecutor, and victim-may ask the juge to carry out any specific acts of
investigation including the cornmissioning of expert reports.116 The idea is
that all parties have the opportunity to influence the content and direction of
the inquiry so that the juge d'instruction is not captive to one particular case
theory, even if, as discussed above, this does not always work well in
practice, given the professional bonds that exist between juge and
procureur as magistrats."7 In cases that the procureur oversees, neither the
suspect nor her lawyer has any rights to participate in the pre-trial
inquiry. Together with the sharp rise in the number of people placed in
police custody for interrogation,' 9 this means that in most cases, the
primary evidence against the accused is not that obtained through a judicial
inquiry, but is rather evidence, such as confessions, that the police obtain
subject of the speech was the independence of the justice system. Id.
114. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 213 (noting the suspect's right to a lawyer
during interrogation by the juge d'instruction and the right to examine the dossier).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 120-21.
117. See supra Part III.A (discussing Outreau).
118. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 212-13 (noting that the rights that attach
to a judicial investigation do not apply to the procureur's pre-trial inquiry).
119. See Les Gardes a Vue Ont Bondi de 23% entre 2004 et 2009, LE MONDE, July 23,
2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/07/23/les-gardes-a-vue-ont-bondi-de-23-
entre-2004-et-2009 1391731_3224.html#ens id=1389987 (last visited Sept. 11, 2010)
(reporting that the number of people placed in garde a vue has risen by nearly a quarter in
five years (23% between 2004 and 2009), according to official statistics analyzed by the
Institut national des hautes tudes de la sdcuritg et de la justice) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Isabelle Mandraud & Alain Salles, Les
Statistiques Officielles Sous-estiment le Nombre Rdel des Gardes 6 Vues, LE MONDE, Jan.
28, 2010, at 12 (reporting that since 2001, there has been a 72% increase, but noting that the
precise figures vary depending on whether those held for traffic offenses are included-they
are generally excluded from the official statistics); Christine Lazerges, Les Disorders de la
Garde a Vue, 30 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROrr PtNAL COMPARE 274, 275
(2010) (revealing that over 100,000 gardes 6 vue last more than twenty-four hours). See
generally INSTITUT NATIONAL DES HAUTES ETUDES DE LA StCURITt ET DE LA JUSTICE, LA
GARDE A VUE EN FRANCE (2010), http://www.inhesj.fr/articles/accueil/ondrp/publications/
focus-hl55al73.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
1380
THE FRENCH PROSECUTOR IN QUESTION 18
before the end of the garde bi vue. 120 Therefore, in the absence of any
corresponding strengthening of either the political independence of the
procureur, the due process rights of the suspect, or the legal aid funding
necessary to make these rights effective, there is a real concern that such a
reform represents a retrograde step, which threatens to undermine the
independence of the judicial process.1
2 1
The number of investigations conducted by the juge d 'instruction is
small and continues to decline (from 20% in the 1 960s to 8% in the 1 990s
and less than 4% currently), and for this reason, some argue that it is a
moribund and irrelevant procedure.122  It is true that the instruction
represents a purer model of judicial investigation: The "Rolls Royce"
version of French criminal justice that most accused persons will not
experience. However, it still represents an important counter-power within
the judicial system, independent of an executive that is closely connected
with the parquet. The cases that the instruction deals with are often the
most complex and politically sensitive dossiers, in which judicial
independence is crucial. 123 In the 1990s, ]uges d'instruction investigated a
number of high profile cases concerning politicians and powerful business
people.12 4  The government's deep sense of unease was apparent as the
executive made a number of attempts to thwart inquiries and to keep
investigations within the control of the procureur, over whom it has a direct
line of authority. 12 1
120. See CC Decision No. 2010-14/22QPC, July 30, 2010, J.0. 105, 16 (noting that
evidence gathered during police questioning often formas the basis of the case to be heard
before court).
121. Press reports at the time of Sarkozy's announcement in January 2009 speak of him
wanting a justice system under the orders of the executive and the temptation for the
Sarkozy state to slide towards totalitarianism. Magistrats et pofitiques s'insurgent contre la
suppression du juge d'instruction, LE MONDE, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.lemonde.
fr/societe/article/2009/0l/06/magistrats-et-politiques-s-mnsurgent-contre-la-suppression-du-juge-d-
-instruction_-1138612 3224.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Muzzling the independent judiciary in this way is described as "a
politician's fantasy"; asking the procureur to pursue the kinds of financial-political affairs
such as the contaminated blood case, or the Elf scandal is asking her to be a "masochist" and
effectively, to commit professional suicide-he view expressed by Sophie C16ment, juge
d'instruction in the financial section in Paris. Objection, monsieur le pr~sident!, LE MONDE,
Jan. 15, 2009, at 19.
122. Guibert, Le Prince, supra note 113.
123. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 81-82 (noting the importance of the cases
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Recent cases include the sentencing to one year in prison of former
interior minister Charles Pasqua for his role in "Angolagate"-the illegal
sale of arms to Angola-in October 2009.126 And just as President Sarkozy
was announcing his intention to kill off the juge d'instruction, the treatment
of his former political colleague and President, Jacques Chirac,
demonstrated the political importance of this magistrat. At the close of the
investigation into the misuse of public funds and breach of trust, the
procureur considered that there was no evidence to support a prosecution of
Monsieur Chirac.12 7 Juge d'instruction Xavibre Simeoni flatly contradicted
this assertion and issued a 215-page report that set out the reasons why the
case would be sent to trial. 12 8 The allegation was that as mayor of Paris,
Chirac had employed a number of people within his administration who
were in fact working for his personal political campaign for the presidential
election.12 9 While the procureur view was that there was no evidence to
verify this claim, the juge d'instruction considered that at least twenty-one
of Chirac's associates were not in fact genuine employees.130 She described
how he used his position as mayor of Paris and as head of the political party
RPR (Rally for the Republic, a right-wing party that merged into the Union
for a Popular Movement party in 2002), to create a confusion of roles
whereby he could use funds from the city's budget for his own electoral
campaign. 131 The evidence showed that the amount of time spent by some
employees on city business was marginal, insignificant, or in some cases
nonexistent. Because of this arrangement, the city of Paris lost an estimated
4.5 million Euros.13 2 Just as with the affairs of the 1990s, when the juges
126. Adam Sage, French Establishment Players Convicted over Arms to Angola
Scandal, TIMES UK, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/
article6892954.ece (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
127. Associated Press, Jacques Chirac to Stand Trial for "Corruption," INDEP., Oct. 30,
2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/jacques-chirac-to-stand-trial-for-
corruption-1811887.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
128. Gdrard Davet, Charles Pasqua, Jacques Chirac: le baroud d'honneur des juges?
Ce que dit l'ordonnance sur la responsabilitd de M Chirac, LE MONDE, Nov. 2, 2009,
[hereinafter Davet, Charles Pasqua] available at 2009 WLNR 21761283.
129. Henry Samuel, Jacques Chirac in the Clear over "Ghost Jobs" Affair, TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/7964112/
Jacques-Chirac-in-the-clear-over-ghost-jobs-affair.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. Id.
131. Davet, Charles Pasqua, supra note 128.
132. Id.
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d'instruction were accused of being political for applying the law to
politicians, this decision is controversial. However, juge d'instruction
Simeoni described her decision not as a choice, political or otherwise, but
as the simple application of her legal duty to send a case before the court
when she considers that an offense has been committed. 33
The timing and the content of the L6ger Report is surprising.
Although numerous bodies have proposed amending or abolishing the role
of juge d'instruction,134 the L6ger Report's recommendation in relation to
the juge d'instruction comes only a short time after the very lengthy and
detailed scrutiny of the juge's role by the parliamentary inquiry into the
Outreau affair.33 The inquiry proposed to remedy the major shortcomings
of the juge d'instruction in that case by strengthening and adapting, rather
than abolishing, the role of the juge d'instruction and bolstering defense
rights.136 In order to avoid the premature narrowing of issues and over-
reliance upon the procureur, the commission recommended a more
collegial approach in which more than one juge d'instruction would work
on a case. 137 The legislature approved this framework and passed a law to
establish such a structure.138 But before this law came into operation,'39 the
133. Id.
134. Compare MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LA MISE EN ETAT DES AFFAIRES PNALE 125
(1991) (recommending a clear separation of investigation and judgment and greatly
improved defense rights in order to develop a more accusatorial procedure), with LGER
REPORT, supra note 108 (emphasizing the rights of the victim in making the procedure more
accusatorial).
135. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Outreau affair). The timing of the publication
of the preliminary report of the Lger commission-just as juge d'instruction Burgaud, of
Outreau fame, appeared before his professional disciplinary body, the Conseil supgrieure de
la magistrature- further underlines the differences between the two inquiries.
136. LGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 513-25 (summarizing the recommendations and
proposing to video record interrogations (recommendation 3), to give the lawyer access to
the case file during the garde a vue (recommendation 4), and to establish a collegial system
of instruction (recommendations 26-31), all of which would reinforce defense rights during
the instruction).
137. See generally id at 353-84.
138. See Alain Salles, La reforme de la justice consacre le pouvoir du parquet, LE
MONDE, March 3, 2010, at 10 (noting that even though the legislature established such a
structure, the death of the juge d'instruction would be a slow one).
139. See LGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 7-8 (noting that a minority of the
commission favored waiting to see how the new arrangement worked out before setting in
motion another major upheaval in this area of criminal justice); see also Bernard Bouloc,
Que Penser Des Propositions du "Comitd Liger"?, 33 RECUEIL LE DALLOz 2264, 2264
(2009) (indicating his views as a member of the minority in the Commission).
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majority view of the LUger Commission superseded it and consequently it
has been put back until 201 1.140
The ambiguity of the procureur's status continues in the
recommendations of the Ldger Commission, whose proposal is not simply
to replace the juge d 'instruction with the procureur. It proposed that the
juge du si~ge, or the juge de 1 en quote et des libert~s (a judge who handles
issues of pre-trial investigation and detention), would exercise judicial
oversight over the prosecutor's decisions .1'4  This person would provide a
counter-power to the extended power of the procureur and would authorize
intrusive investigative acts such as wire taps.14 2 Also, instead of decisions
being subject to the review of the Chambre de 1 instruction, they would be
under the jurisdiction of a new Chambre de 1 en qu&e et des libertiS.143
Ldger does not appear to take account of the systematic failings in
hierarchical accountability discovered by the Outreau inquiry. While
Outreau criticized the failure of dozens of magistrats to sound the alarm in
that case-including the pre-trial review court, the Chambre de
1 instruction-Ldger declares that this system of hierarchy is quite
satisfactory by placing all investigations in the hands of the procureur.'4
Other parts of the report identify training as an important feature of
effective reforms,44' but this proposal does not. It is unclear how this new
arrangement will avoid the problems of judicial corporatism identified in
Outreau, in addition to concerns over the procureur's political
independence. 4
140. See Alain Salles, Reforme de la Procddure PNnale, LE MONDE, Mar. 3, 2010, at 10
(contrasting the wind of unanimity that blew in favor of the Outreau reforms with the wind
of protest that blew against the proposed reforms following LUger).
141. LEGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 6 (recommending first that the juge
d 'instruction be transformed into a juge de 1 en quie et des libertes with a purely judicial
fuinction, leaving the investigation to the procureur).
142. See id. at 9-11 (providing ways in which this new judge will ensure that the
investigation is properly accusatorial).
143. See id. at 27 (laying out the new review process in recommendation 6).
144. See id. at 10 (recommending that the procureur would still be responsible for all
investigations, albeit subject to the proposed judicial checks and counterweights).
145. See id. at 32 (identifying the need for training in relation to the role of the judge at
trial).
146. Unsurprisingly, given that the report is not informed by any independent empirical
research, there are many things the report does not take into account and there are gaps in the
commission's knowledge. For example, the Commission also argues that the opening of an
information represents an unnecessary break in the inquiry, and that keeping the procureur
in charge will maintain continuity. Id. at 8-9. In practice, the reverse is true. The
instruction should allow a fresh approach and should not be a simple and unquestioning
continuation of the police inquiry. It is often the case that the police officers request that the
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Improving the coherence of the criminal process is clearly a part of the
Ldger commission's report and indeed is a part of its claimed rationale in
recommending the abolition of the juge d'instruction in order to create a
single authority in charge of criminal investigations .14 ' However, although
there is one authority in the form of the procureur, two separate procedural
regimes of rights remain-the r~gime simple, which is essentially the same
as that currently in place for procureur supervised investigations, and the
r~gime renforc , in which the suspect enjoys the rights currently available
during the instruction.148 In this way, one duality replaces another. Instead
of giving suspects in all cases the rights that those currently investigated
through the instruction procedure enjoy, the Ldger proposals establish a
two-tiered system in which the gravity of the offense will trigger a different
regime of rights .14 ' The suspect herself can request that she benefit from
this regime and its application will be obligatory when she meets the same
evidentiary threshold for the opening of an information.' 50 The parquet can
also initiate this procedure. 51 The application of the instruction regime of
rights will be obligatory when the suspect's rights are seriously affected;
when she risks a significant penalty; in the case of the most serious
offenses, crimes; and in order for the suspect to be placed in custody or on
conditional bail. 152  It remains to be seen how much this will simplify
matters and precisely what constitutes a significant penalty or when the
suspect's rights are "seriously affected"-arguably this is the case
immediately upon arrest. Despite claims about reinforcing the rights of the
accused, the net result looks like a system of weaker supervision, fewer
defense rights, and no real political independence.
Where does this leave the procureur? Is she a judicial authority or is
she not? The L~ger proposals appear to replicate the confusion evident in
the current arrangements for supervision of the garde b~ vue, in which the
procureur is sufficiently judicial to authorize the detention of a suspect for
two days-not an insignificant length of time-but no longer.' The report
information be opened in order to allow them to continue their investigation with the benefit
of greater powers authorized by the juge d'instruction. Hodgson, Guilty, supra note 2, at 23.
147. See LUGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 7 (explaining how the committee saw the
overlap and confusion of roles as damaging to the criminal investigative process).





153. Id at 18.
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further proposes that the legislature should write the procureur's duty to
d~charge into the CPP, as it is now for the juge d'instruction.' 14  While
formalizing this duty should be welcomed, this process is unlikely to
overcome the procureur's prosecutorial orientation, which is the inevitable
result of her dependence upon the police in carrying out her role in the
investigation and prosecution of crime. To overcome this would require a
huge legal, cultural, and occupational shift, a change which would be
almost impossible to attain alongside the procureur' s retention of the
prosecution function. Neither would it change the fact that the procureur is
a prosecutor, which for the ECtHR, rules her out from being a judicial
authority. '
B. Medvedyev v. France
In contrast to domestic policy, which seeks continually to expand the
role of the procureur as the primary magist rat in charge of criminal
investigations and case disposition, European case law has placed
something of a question mark over the procureur's judicial status. The case
which has most recently brought this to the fore is that of Medvedyev v.
France, which concerned the interception by the French authorities of a
merchant ship, the Winner, registered in Cambodia.156  The vessel was
suspected of carrying large quantities of drugs for distribution across
Europe.157  After the Cambodian authorities gave their permission, the
French Navy located and boarded the ship and brought it directly to Brest
under the authority of the French procureur.15 8 This took approximately
thirteen days due to the weather and the poor condition of the vessel.' 59
The French Navy confined the crew on the ship, and one was fatally
wounded.16 0  The applicants claimed a breach of ECHR Article 5,
paragraph 3: That after detention, they had not been brought promptly
154. Id. at 9; see also MINISTtRE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES LIBERTtS, PROJET DE LOT:
TENDANT A LIMI1TER ET A ENCADRER LES GARDES A VUE 7-17 (2010), available at
http://www.cercle-du-barreau.org/media/01/02/73 1278778.pdf (adopting the report's
proposals for reforming the garde ai vue).
155. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing Medvedyev).
156. Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 6-10 (2008).
157. Id. 17.
158. Id. 8-10.
159. Id. $ 11.
160. Id.
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before a judge.16' They had been detained for thirteen days on board the
Winner before being brought to Brest and then thejuge d'instruction about
eight or nine hours later.'162  In both its first judgment and the second
hearing on appeal before the Grand Chamber, the court found no breach of
ECHR Article 5, paragraph 3, as the applicants went before a judge as soon
as was possible in the exceptional circumstances.163 The poor state of the
Winner accounted for the slow journey to France; and, the number of
suspects and the need for translators in order to question them once in
French police custody meant that it was unavoidable that it would take
several days before some were brought before a judge.'16
The applicants' other argument proved far more controversial. They
argued that they were not detained lawfully in accordance with ECHR
Article 5, paragraph 1.165 In the first judgment in the case in July 2008, the
court ruled that the Cambodians' authority for interception did not provide
a legal basis for detention. 166 Furthermore, the cited French provisions did
not offer sufficient guarantees against arbitrary detention or afford the
detainees sufficient rights to contact a lawyer or a family member during
the period of detention.16 7 It then went on to say that the detention did not
occur under the supervision of a judicial authority as required, because "the
public prosecutor is not a 'competent legal authority' within the meaning
the Court's case-law gives to that notion. .... he lacks the independence in
respect of the executive to qualify as such."'1
6 8
There are reports of French lobbying against this final part of the
court's reasoning because it represents a major attack on the prosecution
function.16 9 In the second judgment on appeal, the Grand Chamber dropped
16 1. Id. 128.
162. Id.
163. See Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11128 (2010)
(supporting the judgment of the Fifth Section in light of new information that the applicants
were brought before the juge d'instruction after eight or nine hours rather than the one or
two days, as it was originally thought).
164. Id. 1131.
165. Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. T128 (2008).
166. See id 1158 (noting that the permission of the Cambodian authorities did not
explicitly cover anything beyond the initial interception by the French authorities).
167. See id 1161 (detailing the ways that the French measures fell short of sufficient
rights protections).
168. Id (quoting Schiesser v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 12-13 (1979)).
169. See, e.g., Ind~pendance Au Parquet: La Cour europ~enne a rendu un arr~t en
demi-teinte, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May. 28, 2010, http:lltempsreel.
nouvelobs.com/dossier/libertes-sous-pression/20100329.OBS1375/independence-du-parquet-la-
cour-europeenne-a-rendu-un-arret-en-denmi-teinte.htmI (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (noting the
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this part of the reasoning.170 The court relied only on the absence of a legal
basis for detention that was sufficiently clear and of a requisite quality to
satisfy the requirement of legal certainty."17 In essence, it did not need to
discuss the judicial quality of the procureur because the detention was
illegal in any event. However, the issue remains alive in the court's
pronouncement on what constitutes an independent judge, a topic that it
discusses in relation to the alleged breach of ECHR Article 5, paragraph
3 172 In underlining the qualities that make the juge d'instruction a judicial
authority for the purposes of the ECHR, the court calls the judicial status of
the procureur into question. Relying on the same authorities that
underpinned its comments on the non-judicial qualities of the procureur in
its first judgment, the court stated that "[t]he judicial officer must offer the
requisite guarantees of independence from the executive and the parties,
which precludes his subsequent intervention in criminal proceedings on
behalf of the prosecuting authority.0 7 3  Despite the claims of French
government officials that this does not address directly the status of the
procureur, it seems that the public prosecutor falls clearly outside of this
definition.
This decision follows a line of case law in which the ECtI-R criticizes
the role of other judicial officers as breaching the principle of equality of
arms,'174 but it contradicts the domestic jurisprudence of the French
Constitutional Court, which has ruled that both magistrats du si~ge and
magistrats du parquet are judicial officers. 17 ' This decision also echoes the
opinion adopted in the joint meeting of the Consultative Council of
European Prosecutors (CCPE) and the Consultative Council of European
Judges (CCJE) in Slovenia in November 2009. 176 This opinion emphasized
reaction of the deputy general secretary of le syndicat de la mnagistrature, Benoist Hurel) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See generally Medved yev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
171. See id. 128 (commenting that investigating possible drug trafficking does not
entitle authorities to violate rights).
172. See id 123-26 (clarifying the requirements for judicial independence).
173. Id. 1124.
174. See Kress v. France, 200 1-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 68-69 (criticizing the role of the
Government Commissioner in the Conseil d'Etat); see also Reinhardt et Sliman-KaYd v.
France, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 640, 664 (criticizing the lack of neutrality on the part of the
investigating judge).
175. CC decision No. 93-326DC, Aug. 11, 1993, J.0. 11599.
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the importance of judicial and prosecutorial independence both with respect
of individual functions and as between functions.17 7 Paragraph 7 follows
the ECtHR line of reasoning that any exercise of a judicial function in
relation to ECHR Article 5, paragraph 3 and Article 6 must be by an officer
independent of executive power and of the parties. 17 8 For this reason, the
Councils asked France to reconsider its proposal to abolish the juge
d'instruction.179
Predictably, the French government has not acknowledged the
devastating blow that this judgment has had on the justice system's
architecture. To do so may stymie attempts to abolish the juge
d'instruction (the reform has so far been postponed until 2011 and some
doubt it will ever see the light of day),180 or at least cause Sarkozy's
government to rethink its position. But if the parquet continues to exercise
powers that require the attribution of a judicial officer, it is acting against
the clear requirements set out in numerous ECtHR judgments and most
recently affirmed in Medvedyev.' 8 ' An additional objection to the ECtHR's
approach is that in criticizing French arrangements, the court is rejecting a
whole procedural tradition and "seeking to impose, without any mandate,
an anglo-saxon model of accusatorial justice across the whole continent." 8 2
While it is undeniable that the parquet functions within the executive
hierarchy, some see this as a model that does not compromise
independence: It does not necessarily entail complete subordination or a
64 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (affirming the validity of continental law systems in which
there may be overlap between prosecutorial and judicial roles) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
177. See id. 20-38 (affirming the importance of independence and laying out
conditions that will be considered sufficiently independent).
178. Id. 7.
179. See id. 25 (recommending that member states should consider removing the
power of public prosecutors to make binding decisions).
180. See Alain Salles, Refonne de la Procedure Penale: Chronique d'une Mort
Annoncie, LE MONDE, May 6, 2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/
05/06/reforme-de-la-procedure-penale-chronique-d-une-mort-annoncee_1347266_3224.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (questioning the government's commitment to reforming the
justice system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing the different functions of
magistrats and the common training of all); see also MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES
LIBERTIS, PROJET DE LOI: TENDANT A LIMITER ET A ENCADRER LES GARDES A VUE 7-17
(2010), available at http://www.cercle-du-barreau.org/media/01/02/731278778.pdf
(affirming the procureur's duty to oversee the garde 6 vue and to safeguard the rights of the
suspect without any additional measure to ensure the efficacy of this role).
182. Jean-Frangois Renucci, Un seisme judiciaire: pour la CEDH les magistrats du
parquet ne sont pas une autoritdjudiciaire, 9 REcUEIL LE DALLOZ 600, 601 (2009).
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duty to follow orders in all aspects of the prosecution function, but rather it
has clear limitations. For example, the minister of justice may give written
instructions to prosecute to the procureur g~ngral or the procureur g~n~ral
may give them to the procureur de la rdipublique; 83 neither is permitted,
however, to issue instructions not to prosecute a case. 184 Individual
procureurs are also free to develop arguments in court,' 85 and regional
heads enjoy their own power to develop policy and organize personnel.1
86
However, the approach of the ECtHR case law on this matter is to
focus on the objective appearance of independence, which is undernined
when prosecutors hold dual investigative and prosecutorial funictions. Even
when the trial prosecutor is different from the one who authorized detention
and carried out the investigation, it is the latent potential of the latter to
become a party in the proceedings that destroys the appearance of
independence.
The case generally cited in support of the ECtHR's approach to
defining what constitutes a judicial officer is Schiesser v. Switzerland.1
8 7
The court had to determine whether the Swiss District Attorney (the
Bezirksanwalt), who has both a prosecution and investigating function, is a
judicial officer for the purposes of ECHR Article 5 paragraph 3. 188 This
person is not the equivalent of the French procureur: Although she
prosecutes minor cases before the single judge, she is elected by universal
suffrage and is under the supervision of the public prosecutor who in turn is
under the authority of the Department of Justice and Government in the
local Canton.189 She does, however, have the power to issue a punishment
order (stralbefehO, which imposes a fine or one month's imprisonment.19
Like the French procureur, she may issue a warrant for arrest and must hear
the arrested person within twenty-four hours, but her powers are more
extensive in that she may order that the suspect be held in custody for up to
183. See C. PR. PtN., supra note 14, art. 30 (setting out this instructional hierarchy).
184. See HODGiSON, FRE~NCH, supra note 1, at 80 (noting the clear limitations on the
entire chain of command when it comes to passing on certain cases).
185. See C. PR. PtN., supra note 14, art. 39-1, for an expression of this concept in the
phrase: "La plume est serve mais la parole est libre."
186. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 228-31 (explaining the national and local
organization of the j udiciary).
187. See Schiesser v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) 1 38 (1979) (finding that
Switzerland's district attorneys are permissibly judicial officers under ECHR Article 5 even
though they have both prosecutorial and investigative functions).
188. Id. 9.
189. Id 1 12-14.
190. Id. 14.
1390
THE FRENCH PROSECUTOR IN QUESTION 19
fourteen days. 9 ' Although the District Attorney is under the authority of
the prosecutor, the court held that the District Attorney had received no
special orders or instructions concerning her power to place someone in
detention.19
The court held that while "'officer" was not the same as "judge"-or
else its inclusion in ECHR Article 5, paragraph 3 would be redundant-the
two shared certain attributes.193  The officer must be independent of the
executive and of the parties; she might be subordinate to other judges,
provided they too were independent'194 The court ruled by a majority that
the District Attorney was a judicial officer in this case because he acted
exclusively in his investigatory capacity; he did not exercise concurrently
his investigatory and prosecution functions. 95 He folio wed his duty to
investigate evidence both for and against the suspect and did not act as a
prosecutor; he neither drew up the indictment nor prosecuted in court .1
The Court was not required, therefore, to determine whether a concurrent
exercise of prosecutorial and investigative fuinctions would prevent the
District Attorney from being considered a judicial officer for the purposes
of ECHR Article 5, paragraph 3.
Contrast this with the latter case of Huber v. Switzerland,'97 in which
the District Attorney, who ordered Huber's detention and investigated the
accusation against her, went on to draw up the prosecution indictment
fourteen months later.'198 Under the Cantonal Code of Criminal Procedure,
the District Attorney was therefore a party in the trial proceedings, though
he did not appear as the prosecuting authority.' 99 The ECtHR in Huber
drew on several more recent military tribunal cases, in which the Dutch
191. Id 15-16.
192. Id 35.
193. See id. 27 (stating that Article 5, paragraph 3 allows an arrested person to be
brought before a judge or officer). The court noted that while "[ilt is implicit in such a
choice that these categories are not identical. ... the Convention..,. presupposes that these
authorities fulfil [sic] similar fuinctions; it thus clearly recognises the existence of a certain




197. See Huber v. Switzerland, 188 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 43 (1990) (holding that
even though the District Attorney who investigated did not prosecute, he had nonetheless
been "entitled to intervene in the... criminal proceedings" which called into doubt his
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auditeur-militai0oo responsible for the arrest and detention of military
personnel was held not to be independent of the parties at the preliminary
stage of the proceedings because he was "liable" to become one of the
parties at the next stage of the case.20 1 By analogy, the District Attorney
here was not considered independent because he too was "liable" to become
a party in the case: "Clearly the Convention does not rule out the
possibility of the judicial officer who orders detention carrying out other
duties, but his impartiality is capable of appearing open to doubt ... if he is
entitled to intervene in the subsequent criminal proceedings as a
representative of the prosecuting authority."20 2  Brincat v. Italy2 0 3 also
concerned an alleged breach of ECHR Article 5, paragraph 3, and the court
again held that it is the "objective appearances at the time of the decision on
detention" that are material.20 It was believed that the public prosecutor
who detained and questioned Brincat was entitled to go on to prosecute him
and so the prosecutor was not independent from the parties in the way
205required of a judicial officer.
In light of this established line of case law, the conclusions of
Medvedyev appear predictable. What is perhaps surprising is that nobody
had challenged the procureur's authority as a judicial officer before, and, in
200. An auditeur-militair is "an officer empowered by law to advise on whether or not
[members of the military] should be referred for trial before a military court." 78
INTERNATIONAL LAw REPORTS 266 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 2001). The auditeur-militair
may "also appear as a prosecuting authority before the military court." Id.
201. See De Jong, Baljet and Van Den Brink v. The Netherlands, App. No. 77, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 49 (1984) ("[T]he auditeur-militair did not enjoy the kind of independence
demanded by Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3). ... [T]he auditeur-militair could not be
independent of the parties at this preliminary stage precisely because he was liable to
become one of the parties at the next stage of the procedure." (citations omitted)); see also
Duinhof and Duijf v. The Netherlands, 79 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 38 (1984) ("[T]he
auditeur-militair could not ... fulfil [sic] the very specific judicial function contemplated by
Article 5 § 3 (art. 5-3) since he at the same time performed the function of prosecuting
authority before the Military Court." (citations omitted)); Van der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and
Klappe v. The Netherlands, 78 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 44 (1984) ("[T]he auditeur-militair
could not be independent of the parties at this preliminary stage precisely because he was
liable to become one of the parties at the next stage of the procedure." (citations omitted)).
202. Huber v. Switzerland, 188 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 43 (1990), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=l&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-
Huber/o20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20Switzerland&sessionid=58575805&skin=hudoc-en.
203. See Brincat v. Italy, 249-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 21 (1992) (finding that the
appearance of impartiality, regardless of actual impartiality, is sufficient to contravene
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particular, her role in ordinary criminal cases in which she quite clearly
does exercise concurrently the role of investigator and prosecutor.
V The Procureur and the Garde At Vue
The thrust of the reforms that the Ldger commission proposed was to
expand the role played by the procureur so that she could absorb much of
the investigative fuinction currently carried out by the juge d 'instruction. 206
This is part of a continuum in which investigative and dispositive power has
shifted away from a purely judicial figure, in favor of the prosecutor.
However, concerns over the proper regulation of the garde 6 vue have
momentarily overtaken this strand of the project, heightened by the recent
decision of the Conseil constitutionnel.20 ' The inability of the defense to
participate in over 95% of criminal investigations and the uncertainty over
the status of the procureur's authority to detain suspects for up to two days
have converged to make this a pressing issue of constitutional
importance. 0
A. The Procureur Overseeing the Garde At Vue
The procureur is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
crime, which includes supervising the police investigation and the detention
and interrogation of suspects in police custody, the garde 6 vue .209 The
French criminal justice process is weighted towards the pre-trial
investigation, in contrast to adversarial procedures where the bulk of fact-
finding takes place at trial .2 10  As a mixed/inquisitorial procedure, this
process of fact-finding is not conducted by the parties, but by a central
figure representing the State.21 Over a century ago, that figure would have
been the juge d'instruction, but as her role has waned, so the procureur's
206. LAGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 8 (proposing that the investigation function
should be shifted to the procureur in the second recommendation).
207. See CC decision No. 93-326DC, Aug. 11, 1993, J.0. 11599 (affirming the judicial
status of both magistrats du si~ge and magistrats du parquet).
208. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing ECtHR-inspired proposals
that would increase procedural protections for defendants).
209. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 143 (setting out the duties of the
procureur).
210. See id (contrasting the inquisitorial and adversarial systems).
211. Id. at 143-44.
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role has increased, such that she now handles around 96% of all criminal
cases. 22Because the investigation is understood to be carried out by a
neutral judicial figure (a magistrat) charged with pursuing both inculpatory
and exculpatory inquiries, the defense's role is very much diminished when
compared to the adversarial procedure. 1 The accused does not require the
same safeguards as might be necessary when the police and prosecution are
constructing the accusation: The judicial nature of the inquiry offers more
protection and avoids the vulnerability of the accused in an adversarial
procedure.2t Significantly, the magistrat affords the prosecution's case
greater credibility at trial than that of the defense because it is seen as the
product of a judicial-or judicially supervised-inquiry into which the
defense has had the opportunity to participate .2 1 5 This may be true in theory
for the instruction, but there is no provision for defense participation in the
21696% of criminal investigations that the procureur oversees.
The procureur' s responsibility for the conduct of the garde 6 vue is
currently the most contested aspect of this supervisory function. During the
1 990s, the suspect in garde 6t vue had access to a defense lawyer-albeit
only for a thirty-minute consultation after twenty hours of detention until
further legislation in 2000 allowed consultation at the outset-a doctor, and
the basic rights to contact a friend or family member and to know the
212. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 22.
213. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 104 (noting the difference in the defense's
role in each system).
214. Id. at 146 (explaining why the accusatorial system requires fewer safeguards for
the defense); Jacqueline Hodgson, Human Rights and French Criminal Justice: Opening the
Door to Pre-Trial Defence Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: Socio-LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 198 (Simon Halliday & Patrick
Schmidt eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hodgson, Human Rights] (describing the vulnerabilities of
the accused in an adversarial procedure). In particular, the dependence on a defense lawyer
is generally regarded as benefitting the rich and those involved in organized crime, as they
will have the best lawyers. Id. at 202. The very poor rates of legal aid heighten this
disparity between retained and assigned counsel.
215. See Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 2-3 (explaining that because the
prosecution's case is judicial in nature, it commands greater weight in the eyes of the
magist rat).
216. Id at 22. In a recent case in Paris, the procureur g~ndral de la Cour de casssation
praised the quality of the procureur's investigation, but suggested that the inquiry pass to the
juge d'instruction in order that a wider investigation be conducted in which full defense
rights of access to the dossier and the assistance of a lawyer would also be available.
Laurence de Charette, Woerth: Curroye determine 6~ garder son dossier, LE FIGARO, Sept.
27, 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/20 10/09/27/01016-20100O927ARTFIG
00637-woerth-courroye-determine-a-garder-son-dossier.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This caused some surprise. Id.
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charges against her.2t The principal safeguard, however, continues to be
the judicial oversight provided by the procureur. 2 18 She must be informed
once someone is placed in garde 6 vue.21 She authorizes that detention and
any extension of the garde 6i vue for up to two days, and she may order the
release of the suspect at any time.22 She then determines whether to
prosecute, drop charges, pass the case to the juge d'instruction for a more
extensive inquiry, initiate mediation or an alternative to trial such as a
guilty plea or composition pe~ale or, in the case of drug trafficking,
organized crime, or terrorism, to ask the juge des libertes et de la d~tention
to authorize further detention in police custody.221' Access to a lawyer may
be delayed for forty-eight hours in instances of organized crime and
seventy-two hours in cases of drug trafficking and terrorism, making the
222procureur's oversight all the more crucial in these cases. When
questioned as to whether lawyers should have more extensive access to
their clients in garde 6~ vue and, in particular, whether they should be
permitted to be present during the police interrogation of the suspect, police
officers always responded that there was no need, as the procureur was
responsible for authorizing and overseeing the period of detention. 2
Empirical research suggests that this trust in judicial supervision is
misplaced. 2 While this trust may safeguard against the most egregious
police abuses, the procureur's ability to oversee or to direct the police
investigation and the garde 6 vue is very limited .225 There is no expectation
that supervision will be anything more than bureaucratic, retrospective, and
based on a review of the case files at the end of detention. 2 Prosecutors
are responsible for large numbers of gardes ii vue across police stations
within their jurisdiction.127  Telephone-based supervision is therefore to
some extent a function of inadequate resources. However, there is no real
217. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 148; Hodgson, Human Rights, supra note 214,
at 195.
218. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 2 1.
219. Id. at 8.
220. Id.
221. Id
222. Id.; C. PR. PtN., supra note 14, art. 63-4.
223. HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 133-35.
224. Hodgson, Human Rights, supra note 214, at 200 (presenting research that suggests
that judicial supervision is not as effective as proponents think it is).
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expectation that responsibility for the garde c6 vue will entail checking up
on specific cases or sitting in on interrogations. 5 Visits to the police
station are rare and always announced in advance;229 to do otherwise would
be regarded as a more intrusive surveillance-style of supervision that would
undermine the all-important trust that exists between police and prosecutor.
While officers are hierarchically accountable to the procureur and must
report to her and gain authorization for measures such as placing someone
in garde b~ vue, the procureur is also dependent upon the police to carry out
her job of investigating crime .230 The procureur directs the police in their
criminal investigation work, but the police hierarchy is responsible for
operations and resources; cooperation is therefore essential .2 "' As a result
of this mutual dependence, they both come to share a crime-control and
prosecution-oriented perspective, in which the truth is equated with a
confession. 3 If supervision consisted of a set of orders from a superior,
the system would cease to function.
One might question the ability of the procureur to act as an effective
supervisor of the garde ii vue, given that she is absent from the police
station and the interrogation of the suspect. Interrogations are not tape-
recorded, the suspect is not cautioned of her right to silence, and she will
have had at most a thirty-minute meeting with a lawyer who is not
permitted to be present during questioning. 3 In organized crime, drug
trafficking, and terrorism cases, she will not have seen a lawyer at all.23
Although the procureur must be informed of the decision to place a suspect
2 28. Id.
229. The C. PR. PtN. requires the procureur to visit each police station within her
jurisdiction only once each year.
230. See HODGsoN, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 76 (describing the mutual dependence
between the police and the prosecutor).
231. See id. at 154-55 (explaining that the police and prosecution must cooperate
because they each have requirements of the other).
232. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 19 (noting that a confession is the
ultimate goal of the police and the prosecution).
233. Id. at 20-21. The March 2010 reform took up the Ldger suggestion of having
audio visual recordings not only for crimes but also-if requested by the police, procureur
or suspect, for d~lits-unless the lawyer is present, but this has been abandoned in the
September 2010 amended reform project. See MINISAtRE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES LIOERTtS,
PROJET DE LOT: TENDANT A LIMITER ETA ENCADRER LES GARDES A vuE 7-17 (2010), available
at http://www.cercle-du-barreau.org/media/01/02/73 1278778.pdf (abandoning the previous
suggestions about audio visual recordings). While the procureur's duty to oversee the garde
bvue is affirmed, she is required to do no more than at present. See id. (putting forth duties
that represent the status quo for the procureur).
234. Id. at 8.
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in garde 6~ vue, the initial power to detain is that of a police officer .23 ' The
Medvedyev decision generates further uncertainty. In direct conflict with
the rulings of the French Constitutional Court, the decision questions
whether the parquet is a judicial authority for the purpose of ECHR Article
5 and the detention of a person in garde 6 vue. 236  A series of ECtHIR
decisions further compounds the situation by articulating the minimum
requirements for an adequate defense provision under ECHR Article 6.23
France has tended to justify its somewhat minimalist due process rights on
the grounds of the protection that the system of judicial supervision offers
suspects. 3 The ECtHR has applied a "margin of appreciation" doctrine,
allowing for the fact that different legal procedures and traditions might
provide the same level of protection in different ways .2 39  However, the
protection that prosecutorial supervision offers is debateable in practice,
and now post-Medvedyev, also in law. This reasoning also looks
increasingly weak as the more recent cECtHR jurisprudence lays down
standards that are universal and not susceptible to dilution in favor of other
types of safeguards that come into play at various points in the process. 4
In contrast to earlier case law, which held that breaches of Article 6 ECHR
at the start of an investigation may be remedied subsequently, resulting in a
fair trial for the accused overall, in its recent case law the court has taken a
more robust stance. 4 It has insisted on the importance of custodial legal
advice as a fundamental and freestanding right, the breach of which will
result in the rights of the defense being "irretrievably prejudiced. 242
235. Id. at7.
236. Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 123-26 (2008).
237. See, e.g., Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 3639 1/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. $T 50-55 (2008)
('Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance
of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation.').
238. See HODGSoN, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 28-29 (noting the Minster of Justice's
comments in defense of judicial supervision procedure).
239. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (1976)
(explaining that the margin of appreciation doctrine allows the court to take into effect the
fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in different signatory states and that
judges are obliged to take into account the cultural, historic, and philosophical differences of
the state).
240. See, e.g., Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. T 54 (2008) ('IIT1he
Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal
proceedings. ").
241. See id. 54 ("Any exception to the enjoyment of [the] right [to legal advice]
should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles
are particularly called for in the case of serious charges .. .
242. Id. T 55.
397
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B. The Califor Greater Defense Rights
In a line of case law beginning with the cases of Salduz v. Turkey and
Panovits v. Cyprus, 243 the ECtHR has given its strongest ruling yet on the
importance of suspects having access to effective custodial legal advice.
The court has condemned the absence of defense counsel at the start of a
suspect's detention in police custody as well as during police interrogation
as a breach of ECHR Article 6 and has described it as irretrievably
prejudicing the rights of the defense." In France, no suspects are
permitted to have their lawyer present during police interrogation, and legal
advice is delayed significantly in cases of organized crime, drug trafficking,
and terrorism. 2
45
In Salduz, the applicant was arrested and questioned by the anti-
terrorism branch of the Izmir Security Directorate in May 2001 on
suspicion of having participated in an unlawful demonstration in support of
an illegal organization, namely the PKI( (the Workers' Party of Kurdistan)
and of hanging an illegal banner from a bridge in Bornova on April 26,
2001.24 The applicant was seventeen years old.247 He was told of the
charges against him and of his right to silence, but was not given access to
legal advice. 4 Under police interrogation, he admitted to the charges
against him, but he immediately retracted these admissions in his statement
to the investigating judge, claiming that they were obtained under duress
and that he had been beaten and insulted by the police. 4 In its first
judgment of April 26, 2007, the Chamber held that there had been no
violation of ECUR Article 6, paragraph 3.~5 Overall, the fairness of the
applicant's trial had not been prejudiced by the lack of legal assistance
during police custody as he had been legally represented at trial, his
confession was not the sole basis for his conviction, and he had been able to
243. See Panovits v. Cyprus, App. No. 4268/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2008) (finding that
the failure to notify the defendant of his right to consult a lawyer violated ECHR Article 6,
§§ 1 and 3-(c)).
244. Id.
245. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 8.
246. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2008).
247. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 9 (2007).
248. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (2008).
249. Id IT14, 17.
250. Salduz v, Turkey, App. No. 3639 1/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 24 (2007).
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challenge the prosecution's case at trial under conditions that did not place
him at a substantial disadvantage vis-c6-vis his opponent. 5
The Grand Chamber reversed this judgment, underlining the
significance of the initial police investigation in shaping the case, the
vulnerability of suspects at this stage in the procedure, and therefore the
importance of the assistance of a lawyer "whose task it is, among other
things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate
himself., 252 The Court found this right to be of particular importance for
serious charges, where the penalties are heaviest. It stated:
[I]n order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently "practical and
effective" ... Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer
should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the
police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular
circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict
this right .... The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably
prejudiced when incriminating statements made during 2P3olice
interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
In Panovits, the applicant was also seventeen years old and in April
2000, he was questioned on suspicion of murder and robbery.25 His father
accompanied him to the police station, but was not present during his son's
interrogation, .5Thaplcant was cautioned, but neither he nor his father
was informed of his right to legal advice prior to questioning. 256 Panovits
made a written confession, but claimed that this was involuntary and
induced through psychological deception, promises, threats, and tactics
designed to instill fear .251 He also said that he was drunk at the time and
thus unable to recall the events about which he was being questioned. 5 In
May 2001, the applicant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, and
his appeal was subsequently dismissed .259 Before the European Court, the
applicant claimed he had not been informed of his right to legal advice prior
to being questioned, which was particularly detrimental to his defense given
his status as a minor and the absence of his father during his police
251. Id 23.
252. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 54 (2008).
253. Id. 55.





259. Id %26, 31.
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interrogation, and that he had not been adequately informed of his right to
silence .26 0 He alleged that these facts constituted a violation of Article 6
ECHR.26
In another strongly worded judgment, the Court again underlined the
crucial nature of custodial legal advice. It stated:
[T]he concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 requires that the accused
be given the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial
stages of police interrogation. The lack of legal assistance during an
applicant's interrogation would constitute a restriction of his defense
rights in the absence of comnpelling reasons that do not prejudice the
overall fairness of the proceedings.26
The Court found that in this instance there was a violation of Article 6
ECHR.26 The applicant was unaware of his right to legal advice and of the
consequences of being questioned without a lawyer; there was insufficient
provision of information about the right to consult a lawyer prior to
interrogation; in the absence of a lawyer or guardian present during
interrogation, the applicant did not comprehend sufficiently the nature of
his rights, such as the right against self-incrimination; and there was no
waiver of the right to legal advice in the unequivocal and explicit manner
required to avoid a breach ECHR Article 6 .264 Finally, as in Salduz, the
Court did not consider that this pre-trial violation was remedied by
subsequent proceedings. 6 These decisions have been affirmed by later
cases such as Pishchalnikov v. Russia, 6 in which the ECtHR found that the
absence of legal assistance during the (adult) applicant's police
interrogation breached ECHR Article 6.26
France has felt the impact of these decisions; lawyers have challenged
successfully the compatibility of French criminal procedure with the
guarantees of the ECHR.26 The first case that received publicity was a





265. Id 75; Shabelnik v. Ukraine, App. No. 16404/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (2009);
Plonka v. Poland, App. No. 203 10/02, Eur. Ct. H.R, 41 (2009).
266. See Pishchalnikov v. Russia, App. No. 7025/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. $T 79-80 (2009),
(finding that being informed of the right to remain silent and being provided a form stating
rights prior to confession was not enough to assume a waiver of the right to legal
representation).
267. Id 92.
268. See Andr6 Giudicelli, Chroniques, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT
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decision of the Bobigny juge de la ditention et des libertis on November
30, 2009.269 The judge found that the garde a vue did not conform to
Article 6 ECHR: The suspect had been denied his right to a lawyer at the
start of the garde ei vue and during interrogation. 2 70 Basing any conviction
on incriminating statements obtained in this way caused irretrievable
prejudice to the rights of the defense.271  A string of further cases
followed.2 72 On December 30, 2009, the tribunal correctionel in Bobigny
went further and set out what was required under Article 6 ECHR. In
addition to those rights set out in the French CPP, the suspect is entitled to
the immediate assistance of a lawyer for moral support, to discuss her
defense, and to prepare for interrogation. The lawyer in turn must have
access to the dossier or to information on the charges faced by her client.
Informing the lawyer of the date and nature of the offense, as stipulated by
CPP Article 63-4, was wholly inadequate as it provided no information on
the evidence against the suspect, preventing her from preparing for
interrogation or the confrontation with the complainant.273 Her right to
legal assistance, in the sense required by the ECHR, had not been
respected.274 A month later, the Paris tribunal correctionnel ruled as
271
inadmissible five gardes ii vue for the same reasons. It also struck out
the prosecution's proceedings on the grounds that they were not the result
of an inquiry a charge et a dicharge, but were based on a wholly
prosecution-oriented investigation conducted through the garde ti vue, in
which the defense had no opportunity to participate.2 76 In Nancy, the court
excluded evidence obtained in the absence of a lawyer, but left the rest of
PENAL COMPARt, 182, 183-89 (2010) (discussing these cases); Albert Maron & Marion
Haas, Tandis que les gardes a vue explosent, la garde 6 vue implose. .. , 22 DROIT PENAL:
LES REVUES JURISCLASSEUR 10, 10-18 (2010) [hereinafter Maron & Haas, Tandis] (same).
269. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Bobigny, Nov. 30, 2009, [hereinafter TGI Bobigny] available at
http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/files/2009/12/decision-jld-bobigny-cedh. 1259
856473.pdf; Maron & Haas, Tandis, supra note 268, at 12.
270. TGI Bobigny, supra note 269; Maron & Haas, Tandis, supra note 268, at 12.
271. TGI Bobigny, supra note 269; Maron & Haas, Tandis, supra note 268, at 12.
272. See generally Maron & Haas, Tandis, supra note 268 (discussing this string of
cases).
273. Id. at 13.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 13-15.
276. Id.
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the proceedings intact.27 The appellants were held on suspicion of drug
trafficking and so denied access to a lawyer for seventy-two hours. 7
There is evidence that this is also having some influence on practice.
As early as July 2009, the chief prosecutor of Paris allowed the defense full
access to the ongoing investigation into the financial dealings of the
politician Julien Dray, in order that they could request additional
investigations before the procureur determined whether or not to send the
case for trial .2 79 This mirrors to some extent the regime of the instruction in
which prosecution, defense, and victim can all request specific acts of
investigation, including expert reports. In December 2009, the parquet
announced that it would not formally prosecute Monsieur Dray.28 In May
2010, Grenoble senior prosecutor Christophe Vivet explained that he had
allowed a lawyer to be present during police interrogation in line with
recent ECtHR jurisprudence. 8 He believed that to refuse custodial legal
advice to a suspect who has explicitly requested a lawyer risked
compromising the validity of the procedure. 8
In March 2010, the Justice Minister proposed a reform of the garde 6~
vue, following the recommendations of the LUger Commission: A second
consultation with the suspect after twelve hours of detention, access to the
record of any interrogation, and if detention is prolonged beyond twenty-
four hours, the possibility to be present throughout the garde 6~ vue
including during any questioning of her client.28 The video recording of all
interrogations, rather than just those involving the most serious offenses as
is currently required, is an aspiration rather than a concrete proposal. This
strengthening of defense rights is welcome, especially given the uncertainty
over the nature of the protection that can be offered by prosecutorial
supervision of the garde ii vue in law and in practice. It is, however,
277. Id. at 17.
2 78. Id.
279. Gdrard Davet, Julien Dray ne devrait pas 6tre renvoy9 devant le tribunal
correctionnel, LE MONDE, Dec. 16, 2009, available at 2009 WVLNR 253 38197.
280. Id.
281. Garde divue: une avocate assiste son client pendant 1 interrogatoire de garde di
vue, LEs EcHos, May 6, 2010, http://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/publications/actualites/
garde-a-vue-une-avocate-assiste-son-client-pendant-1-interrogatoire-de-garde-a-vue (last
visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. Id.
283. Guillaume Didier, porte-parole du ministfre de la Justice et des Libert~s, Reforme
de la garde 6i vue (2010), http://www.presse.justice.gouv.frlu-vu-entendu-1 1603/reforme-
de-la-garde-a-vue-20025.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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modest when compared with the more ambitious and ECtHR-inspired
proposals made by a number of politicians to allow suspects access to a
lawyer during police interrogation from the outset of the garde a vue; to
allow the lawyer access to the case file; and to remove the exceptional
procedures in which protections such as custodial legal advice can be
delayed.284 Strengthening suspects' access to lawyers is important, but it
also requires appropriate funding in order to be effective. Criminal defense
lawyers are not well paid,285 and the structure of the profession means that
they tend not to specialize.286 Earlier and more extensive access to suspects
held in garde i vue will increase legal aid costs substantially if it is to be
available to all. This is all the more important given that the central plank
of protection for suspects-supervision of the garde a vue by the
procureur-is increasingly in question.2 87
However, it became clear that these changes would not be enough in
light of the recent decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, holding that the
provisions regulating the garde i vue are contrary to the values enshrined in
the French Constitution.288 On March 1, 2010, the first day on which the
provision came into force, lawyers in Paris made use of the new procedure
to raise a question of constitutional importance.289 La question prioritaire
284. Maron & Haas, Tandis, supra note 268, at 11 (referencing six proposed reforms
lodged by members of the National Assembly: prop. AN Aeschlimann, No. 2181, prop. AN
Goulard, No. 2191, prop. AN Hunault, No. 2193, prop. AN Vallini, No. 2295, prop. AN
Mambre, No. 2356, prop. AN Candelier, No. 2364). Three proposals were lodged with the
Senate: prop. Sdnat Boumedidne-Thiery, No. 201, prop. Sdnat Borvo Cohen Seat, No. 286,
prop. Sdnat Mdzard, No. 208. Id. The proposals were ultimately rejected.
285. While private clients are charged 150 Euros an hour, criminal legal aid pays only
200 Euros for a case in the tribunal correctionnel, with a minimum of six hours of work.
Marie Piquemal, Interview with Jean-Louis Borie, syndicat des avocats de France, Aide
juridictionnelle: Le gouvernement s'en prend aux plus modestes, LIBtRATION, July 15,
2010, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101647176-aide-juridictionnelle-le-gouvemement-s-
en-prend-aux-plus-modestes (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
286. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 33.
287. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the questionable status of the
procureur as ajudicial authority).
288. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing CC decision No. 2010-
14/22QPC).
289. See Pascale Robert-Diard, Nouvelle offensive des avocats contre les conditions de
garde a vue: Ils veulent profiter de I'entre en vigueur d'une disposition de la reforme
constitutionnelle, LE MONDE, Mar. 2, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4265268 (explaining
that Parisian lawyers used the adoption of the new provision as an occasion to challenge
several articles of the C. PR. PEN. in what eventually became CC Decision No. 2010-
14/22QPC).
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de constitutionnalitg brings into effect Article 61-1 of the Constitution,
adopted on July 23, 2008.290 It provides that in a case before the court,
where it is maintained that a legislative provision offends against the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the Conseil constitutionnel
can be required to rule on the question through a reference from the Conseil
d'Etat or the Cour de cassation.2 9 1  The Parisian lawyers questioned
whether CPP Articles 62, 63, 63-1, 63-4, 77 and 706-73 offend the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, namely, the principle of
respect for the rights of the defense, of a fair trial, of individual freedom, of
freedom of movement-the right not to be subject to arrest unless strictly
necessary-and the principle of equality.292 They supported their claims
with reference to the principles set out in the ECtHR jurisprudence, arguing
that custodial legal advice must be real, effective, and available throughout
the period of detention-including the interrogation of the suspect-and
that the lawyer must have access to the dossier of evidence in order to be
able to advise the client effectively. 293
In a landmark decision, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled that with the
exception of CPP Articles 63-4 and 706-3,294 which it had already examined
in 2004,295 the provisions raised were all contrary to the constitution.296
290. Conseil constitutionnel, 12 Questions to Begin with, http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/priority-preliminary-rulings-on-the-issue-
of-constitutionality/12-questions-to-begin-with.47857.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
291. Conseil constitutionnel, Ordinance No 58-1067 Constituting an Institutional Act
on the Constitutional Council, § 23-4 (2009), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank mm/anglais/enordinance 58_1067.pdf. The ruling must take
place within three months; the question of compatibility must not have been previously
decided and it must relate to a new matter or one that is of a serious nature.
292. CC Decision No. 2010-14/22QPC, July 30, 2010, J.O. 105, 2-11.
293. Id. This is, of course, rejected by the government. The ministry of justice
criticized lawyers for using the ECtHR cases to criticize the French garde 6 vue procedure,
when they have never seen fit to challenge it before the ECtHR themselves. Didier
Guillaume, port-parole du ministbre de la Justice et des Libertis, Garde & vue-Question
prioritaire de constitutionnalitg et CEDH (2010), http://www.presse.justice.gouv.fr/lu-vu-
entendu-11603/garde-a-vue-questions-prioritaires-de-constitutionnalite-et-cedh-20031.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It also
noted that the Justice Minister had already announced her intention to reform the garde 6
vue back in July 2009. Id.
294. These relate to the prolonged detention period and delayed access to custodial
legal advice for suspects held on suspicion of organized crime, drug trafficking, and
terrorism.
295. See Conseil constitutionnel, Decision no 2004-492 DC March 2nd 2004: The Act
Adapting the Administration of Justice to the Changing Face of Crime (2004), available at
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Although they had been examined when the original legislation was passed
in 1993, the Conseil considered that the circumstances of their operation
had changed considerably over the last twenty years.29 More specifically,
the number of cases dealt with through the instruction procedure has
declined, while those under the authority of the procureur have
increased .298  The temps r~el procedure means that many cases are
prosecuted and disposed of on the basis of evidence gathered during the
period of the garde 6 vue; this has now become the principal phase on
which the dossier is based and on which the accused is judged .299 There has
also been a huge rise in the number of people placed in garde ei vue in poor
material conditions; recourse to detention is systematic even in minor
cases 300 such that there is a banalisation of the use of the garde ~i vue. 301
Having set out why it believed it necessary to re-examine these provisions,
the Conseil went on to examine the balance struck between the need to
investigate crime and maintain public order on the one hand, and the
obligation to ensure the proper exercise of constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms on the other. 0 It concluded that the provisions regarding police
custody did not strike the balance in the appropriate way. 0 In particular,
resort to the garde ii vue as a repressive measure is too fr~equent and too
easily authorized by the police in the first instance; the suspect is not told of
her right to silence and is not afforded effective assistance from her defense
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fir/conseil-constitutionnel/rootlbank-nmm/anglais/a2004
492dc.pdf (ruling that these provisions conformed to the Constitution after examining the
March 9, 2004 law). It was not a fresh issue as required under the QPC procedure.




300. Excluding motoring cases that are not present in the official statistics, the principal
reasons for placing a suspect in garde 6 vue include offences against immigration police
(72,466), assaults (59,730), drug use (49,008), receiving stolen goods (22,505), and
shoplifting (19,355). Bastien Hugues, Les Sages exigent une reforme de la garde ci vue, LE
FIGARO, July 30, 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/20 10/07/30/01016-
201 00730ART'FIG00482-les-sages-exigent-une-reforme-de-la-garde-a-vue.php (last visited
Nov. 16, 20 10) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
301. M. Daniel W. et al., Commentaire de la dicision n' 2010-14/22 QPC-juillet
2010, 30 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 15 (2010), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/rootbank/download/201 0-14/
22QPC-cccl14cic.pdf.
302. CC Decision No. 2010-14/22QPC, July 30, 2010, J.0. 105, 29.
303. Id
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lawyer, irrespective of the circumstances of the case or the need to preserve
evidence or protect an individual.30
The Justice Minister was required to develop the March 2010 reform
project to take account of this new decision.30 s The amended project, set
out in September 2010, concerns ordinary cases, leaving the exceptional
regime for organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism in place.306 The
Conseil constitutionnel stated that it lacked jurisdiction to consider these
measures; the government has interpreted this rather more ambitiously as a
positive endorsement of their constitutionality.307  The suspect will be
informed of her right to silenceo30  and may inform a friend and her
employer (rather than in the alternative, as at present) of her detention.309
But the most significant proposal, predictably, is to allow lawyers to be
present during the interrogation of the suspect in garde 6 vue. 3 10 However,
there are a number of important limitations. Consultation remains limited
to thirty minutes and the second consultation remains at twenty-four hours
304. Id. J 27-28.
305. This is described in positive terms, as "enriching" the reform project. Garde ai
vue: projet de reforne enrichi, LE FIGARO, July 30, 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-
actu/2010/07/30/97001-20100730FILWWWO0530-garde-a-vue-projet-de-reforme-
enrichi.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
306. See generally MINISTtRE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES LIBERTS, PROJET DE LOI: TENDANT
A LIMITER ET A ENCADRER LES GARDES A VUE (2010), http://www.cercle-du-
barreau.org/media/01/02/731278778.pdf [hereinafter PROJET DE LOI]. This reform will have
to be revised yet again in the light of the decision of the Cour de cassation on October 19,
2010, which held that the arrangements for custodial legal advice in all Gardes 6 vue,
including the exceptional regimes for terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, are
contrary to the requirements of the ECHR. Cour de cassation, Communiqud relative aux
arrest rendus le 19 octobre 2010 par la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation,
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/chambercriminelle 578/arrestrendus_1783
7.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. See Jacqueline Hodgson, The French garde 6 vue declared unconstitutional 174
JUST. PEACE NEWS 523, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract _id=1669915. But see Cour de cassation, Communiqud relative aux arrest rendus le
19 octobre 2010 par la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation,
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/chambercriminelle 578/arrestrendus_1783
7.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (providing the most recent decision of the Cour de
cassation which declared on October 19, 2010 that the exceptional procedures in place for
delaying access to custodial legal advice to those detained on suspicion of terrorism,
organized crime, and drug trafficking, were contrary to the ECHR) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
308. PROJETDELoI,supra note 306, art. 73:5.
309. Id. art. 73:16.
310. Id. art. 77:19.
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-rather than at twelve hours as proposed in March.31' If the police feel
that the necessities of the investigation require the lawyer's presence in
interrogation to be delayed, the procureur can authorize this for up to
twelve hours in order to assemble or to preserve evidence. 1 Access to the
suspect's statements can be delayed for the same reason .3 13 Furthermore,
while the March reform proposed allowing lawyers to ask questions at the
close of interrogation, they are now permitted simply to make written
observations. 1
Lawyers have been critical that the reform does not go far enough and
continues to restrict custodial legal advice unnecessarily. 315  As one Le
Figaro journalist describes it, lawyers consider that the doors to the police
station are not open, but only ajar.31 Furthermore, the exceptional regimes
are untouched (which appears contrary to the ECtHR jurisprudence) and a
mini-custody procedure is proposed in which a suspect is held only for the
time necessary to take a statement-with none of the rights available to
those in garde 6i vue.31 While the numbers of those detained in garde 'i vue
may decrease, it may be that they are simply displaced into a new regime (a
garde 6~ vue lite, if you will) during which they enjoy no legal advice. And
for the reform to have any real impact, legal aid provision will have to
increase substantially and lawyers will need to organize and train in order to
meet the challenge of this extended role.
Police, too, are skeptical about the reform. Just as they opposed the
initial provisions allowing custodial legal advice in 1993, they fear that this
further encroachment into their territory will undermine the investigation.
Their depiction of the roles of legal actors is telling: While the police
311. Idart. 73:18.
312. Id art. 73:19.
313. Id. art. 73:18.
314. Id. art. 73:20.
315. See, e.g., Press Release, Syndicat de la magistrature, Projet de r~forme de la garde
A vue: une occasion historique, un texte insuffisant (Sept, 8, 2010), available at
http://www.syndicat-magistrature.org/Projet-de-reforme-de-la-garde-a.htmnl (criticizing the
report's narrow approach and effect). A strike was called in Dijon on September 29th in
protest at the inadequacy of the reform. Garde ii vue: avocats en action, LE BIEN PUBLIC,
Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.bienpublic.com/fr/accueil/article/3 859407/Garde-a-vue-avocats-
en-action.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
316. Laurence de Charette, Refontne de la garde ti vue: les avocats doivent s'organiser
LE FIGARO, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/09/08/01016-
20100908ART'F1G00542-reforme-de-la-garde-a-vue-les-avocats-doivent-s-organiser.php
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
317. PROETDEL,0supra note 306, art. 73:1, 73:2.
407
67 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1361 (2010)
describe interrogation as creating the "intimacy of a confessional" which
establishes a relationship of trust that allows the suspect to "relieve her
conscience," they portray the arrival of the lawyer as "inviting silence and
reinforcing her sense of impunity."318
The Conseil recognizes that for its July ruling to take effect
immediately would throw the criminal justice system into disarray.31 9 It has
therefore delayed its coming into effect until July 1, 2011, allowing time for
legislation.32 0 It has also made clear that the garde cb vue procedure cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional until that time, creating a kind of limbo
where we know the provisions are wrong, but we have to apply them
nonetheless.3 21
VI. Conclusion
The French government's proposal earlier this year to abolish the juge
d'instruction and to place the parquet in charge of all criminal
investigations, has put the independence of the procureur under the
spotlight at a time when it has been subject to challenge within the
322European arena. The proposed reform, based on the Ldger Commission
report, gives the executive the judicial power to supervise and to direct all
criminal investigations through the authority that it is able to exercise over
the parquet.32 3 But at the same time, the ECtHR in the Medvedyev case has
indirectly questioned whether the procureur is sufficiently independent of
318. Christophe Comevin, Reforme de la garde a vue: les policiers trds reserves, LE
FIGARO, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/09/08/01016-20100908
ARTFIG00508-reforme-de-la-garde-a-vue-les-policiers-tres-reserves.php (last visited Nov.
16, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
319. CC Decision No. 2010-14/22QPC, July 30, 2010, J.O. 105, $ 30.
320. Id. The current reform proposal would take effect in July 2011.
321. Id.
322. There is a certain irony in the fact that the hierarchical nature of the parquet is
justified on the grounds of the importance of democratic accountability, yet the findings of a
parliamentary committee are simply brushed aside when they do not coincide with the
wishes of the President-who goes on to set up his own committee and makes clear what he
wants them to recommend, or at least what his reform will be. This is all part of what is
frequently described as the hyper-presidence of Sarkozy: His tendency to attempt to control
all aspects of French political life.
323. See generally Jean Pradel & Didier Gudrin, Les relations entre le minst~re public
et le minstre de la justice dans l'avant-projet de reforme de la procedure pinale, 11 RECUEIL
DALLOZ 660 (2010).
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the executive and of the parties in the case to qualify as a judicial
authority. 2
The French government has rejected the reasoning in the Medvedyev
case and preceding line of case law, refusing to acknowledge its
implications for the French procureur. 3 25  Similarly, it has sought to
minimize the impact of Salduz and the subsequent cases underlining the
importance of immediate and effective custodial legal advice for suspects,
claiming that they apply only to the respondent countries and that no direct
challenge has been brought against French arrangements. 2 Historically,
this has been France's approach: To do the minimum necessary in order to
ensure legislative compliance with the ECHR, rather than to embrace the
spirit of European jurisprudence .1 2 ' The result is a hybrid procedure that
contains the vestiges of a centralized inquisitorial model-and an inferior
version at that, given the procureur's lack of clear judicial status-but with
some safeguards of the two party system grafted on. The presence of the
defense is increasingly required in the administration of new measures such
as the guilty plea procedure, but the protection that this can offer is limited;
we know that the key to criminal cases is in the early stages of the
investigation: The garde t vue. If the defense is not protected adequately
at this stage, the interests of the accused are likely to be prejudiced
irretrievably, as demonstrated in miscarriages of justice and now set out by
the ECtHR. This is especially so in French criminal procedure: The pre-
trial investigation produces the dossier of the "judicial inquiry" and so, in
practice, it assumes a central importance in the case.
This position now looks difficult to maintain. France's own
constitutional council has dealt a severe blow to the garde 6~ vue regime,
declaring it to be against the values of the constitution in a decision directly
inspired by the very European jurisprudence from which the government
sought to distance itself.328 Quite simply, the procureur's supervision of
the garde 6~ vue cannot justify or compensate for the very poor level of due
process safeguards.
It is significant that this decision comes from a domestic court. The
consequences of both Medvedyev and Salduz were ill-received not only
324. See Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 63 (2008) (clarifying
the requirements for judicial independence).
325. See Didier, supra note 283 (noting the French government's reaction).
326. See id (noting the arguments that the French government has formulated to avoid
being bound by these new precedents).
327. See generally Hodgson, Human Rights, supra note 214, at 185-208.
328. CC Decision No. 2010-14/22QPC, July 30, 2010, 1.0. 105, 29.
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through a natural resistance to criticism, but also because they were seen as
an attack on French legal culture and an attempt to set down requirements
for a more adversarial procedure at the European level. Salduz in particular
represents a move away from the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
through which national differences are tolerated and rejects the argument
that breaches at one stage of the procedure can be remedied at a later point.
Instead, it holds that custodial legal advice is a universal and freestanding
right, irrespective of procedural tradition. This fear and demonization of
the defense lawyer manifests itself whenever there is some strengthening of
defense rights 329 and it was again apparent in the reactions of some Le
Monde readers to the breaking news of the Conseil constitutionnel's
decision on the garde 6i vue.33
The reform proposals presented in September 2010 make some
adjustments to reflect the concerns of the Conseil constitutionnel but their
success will depend as much on a change in legal culture and an acceptance
of the legitimacy of the lawyer's role. Some commentators see increasing
the role of the defense lawyer as a direct attack on the role of the procureur
and the procedural tradition of judicial supervision .33'1 Despite the model of
defense participation that has been developed through legislation (if not
practice) during the instruction, there is still resistance to the idea that the
defense role might complement that of the procureur, act as a
counterbalance, and ensure that all relevant information is obtained and
inquiries carried out.332  The parquet's ability to provide independent
329. See generally HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 28-29, 124-41.
330. Some consider this a move to "Anglo-Saxon" criminal justice; others voice
concern that this will benefit only the rich. Aline Leclerc, Garde 6~ vue: "Cette
d~cision est une v~ritable revolution!", LE MONDE, July 30, 2010,
http://www.lemonde. fr/societe/reactions/20 10/07/30/garde-a-vue-cette-decision-est-
une-veritable-revolution_-1394198_3224.html#opened (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
331. Most people do not trust lawyers and see them as benefitting the rich and those
involved in organized crime. People also categorize lawyers as entrepreneurs who act for
suspected criminals, whereas they see procureurs as magistrats who acts in the interests of
society. See HODGSON, FRENCH, supra note 1, at 135-41, for the comments of magistrats
and police.
332. Even the Ldger committee opposed the presence of the lawyer in the garde 6i vue
from the outset on the grounds that this would compromise the effectiveness of the inquiry.
LEGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 18. Research has established that across jurisdictions, the
initial period of detention and interrogation is very often determinative of the case's
outcome. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 19. It is therefore paramount that
due process safeguards are in place in order to ensure that the evidence is thorough and
reliable. However, the lUger committee frames its view in terms of the first hours of
investigation being determinative of the discovery of the truth, and it does not want a
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supervision of the police investigation is open to challenge in practice and
in law. In contrast to the rights of the defense during the instruction, the
lawyer's structural exclusion from the pre-trial phase has made it
impossible for her to participate and undermines the promise of a procedure
that is contradictoire. If the Justice Minister is serious about requiring the
parquet to investigate 6i d~charge, it must recognize and support the
lawyer's role in helping to achieve this requirement. This can only
strengthen the independence of the procureur' s role, which is paramount
given that 96% of investigations are under her authority and that figure may
soon rise to 10.3
defense lawyer getting in the way of this process. See LEGER REPORT, supra note 108, at 17-
26 (explaining this view in the fifth recommendation).
333. Hodgson, The Investigation, supra note 90, at 22.
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